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ABSTRACT 
 
 There is a robust increase in the number of various kinds of non-state actors 
and a growing involvement of their role in many local and international key policy 
concerns that range from humanitarian and environmental fields, civil society issues, 
monitoring human rights violations, multinational corporations, national liberation 
movements, and guerilla and terrorist networks. Despite the slight realization of their 
place and role in the liberal approach and some other theories, a lot of aspects related 
to them, are still undermined in favor of the primacy given to states as the principal 
and exclusive actors.  
This thesis intends to demonstrate the active and undeniable role of non-state 
actors in the light of the liberal paradigm by taking the changing political program of 
the PLO as an example. It will serve as well to criticize the basic notion of the realist 
paradigm that stresses on states as the principal actors in world politics. In fact, the 
PLO, an example on one category of non-state actors, has shown to be efficient and 
active in regional politics and on the international stage in an attempt to achieve its 
political objectives; it was able to put the Palestinian cause on regional and 
international agendas, was recognized by the United Nations and the Arab League 
and finally succeeded to become a non-member observer at the UNGA.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1- Introductory Word 
Much has been written on the traditional theories of international relations, 
their characteristics and the way they provide interested audiences with views and 
approaches toward understanding the international system. These theories have tried 
to cover the various actors in world politics and their complex relationships to 
understand the dynamics of the international system, domestic politics, decision-
making processes and foreign policy behavior. There is a general consensus among 
some political scientists that realism is lacking because it neglects a crucial and a 
direct participant in world politics known as non-state actors. Many of them have 
tried to include non-state actors in their studies since early seventies until today. For 
instance, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye focus on the increasing significance of 
non-governmental actors in global interactions in “Transnational Relations in World 
Politics” (1971) in addition to other studies such as Power and Interdependence 
(1977). Many critics believe that the latter is one of the most influential works to try 
to develop an alternative pluralistic paradigm that challenges the state-centric 
approach and includes non-state actors. Keohane and Nye were the first to come up 
with the concept of “complex interdependence” and challenge the main notions on 
which classical realism is built. They explain that “non-state actors such as private 
banks and multinational corporations have become a normal part of foreign as well 
as domestic relations” (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 26). Likewise, Richard Mansbach 
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and John Vasquez describe the growing involvement of non-state actors in their 
study entitled “The Web of Politics: Non-State Actors in the Global System”. In 
some other approaches to international relations, the term “non-state actor” has been 
explicitly mentioned and discussed. In similar vein, Oran Young during the seventies 
came up with the mixed actor approach where he said that the increasing complexity 
and diversity of the international system entails a perspective or a school of thought 
that emphasizes the interaction between different types of actors regardless of any 
kind of dominance or hierarchical relationships (Young, 1972). Though he did not 
succeed in developing a comprehensive theory based on the interplay between states 
and non-state actors, he succeeded in showing that states are not necessarily the 
dominant actors in world politics. Young‟s significant work allowed other scientists 
to build further studies such as James Roseneau. Roseneau is one of those who 
gathered earlier pluralist approaches to present an integrated paradigm where non-
state actors are direct participants. He says in his book Turbulence in World Politics 
(1990) that there is “an autonomous multi-centric world, which includes sovereignty 
– free actors, that competes and interacts with the old state-centric world 
characterized by states and their interactions (Roseneau, 1990, p. 247). In other 
words, the author wants to say that there is an integration and overlapping between 
non-state actors and states because of many factors mainly globalization, 
interdependence, and transnational corporations and organizations. Despite his 
emphasis on the interaction and integration between both entities (state-centric and 
non-state actors), he insists on distinguishing “between two separate sets of complex 
actors that overlap and interact even as they also maintain a high degree of 
independence” (Roseneau, 1990, p. 252). While his work is significant mainly in 
realizing the important role of non-state actors in the realm of international relations, 
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his theory suffers from some flaws mainly his inability to categorize the different 
kinds of non-state actors.  
I see that non-state actors and their roles are important to discuss because 
they have not been addressed holistically in the study of international relations. In a 
globalized interdependent world, non-state actors are indeed increasing in terms of 
number, and they have complex functions in different fields. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need to address the different aspects that govern these actors mainly including 
them in a grand school of thought of international relations, addressing their legal 
status, and working on promoting this legal frame by accommodating them in the 
United Nations Charter. National liberation movements are important to discuss too 
under this banner not only because they are considered an integral category of non-
state actors but also to shed light on their role and the way they function to fulfill 
their national aspirations. National liberation movements have been active in many 
parts of the globe especially in the awake of the twentieth century and during the 
decolonization period in the MENA region. In his article “The Regulation of Armed 
Non-State Actors: Promoting the Application of the Laws of War to Conflicts 
Involving National Liberation Movements”, Doctor Noelle Higgins says that “if 
national liberation movements are seen to act in accordance with international legal 
principles, states may view these movements as genuine and valid actors, rather than 
rebel or terrorists. Such a perceived status change could ameliorate the plight of 
national liberation movements and the people they represent, for example by helping 
them to receive international aid” (Higgins, 2009, p. 13,). As a result, the author 
emphasized the necessity of regulating armed non-state actors and promoting the 
implementation of International Humanitarian Law and the application of the laws of 
war that involve them. 
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Concerning the PLO, it is fruitless to study the political or the historic 
conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis or to narrate the history of the 
organization or to speak of the course of the peace process because many studies and 
research have been done on these particular issues. This thesis attempts to discuss a 
different aspect of the organization which is being an effective regional player as a 
non-state actor. The political program of the organization during the conflict with the 
Israelis has rendered the PLO an effective legitimate non-state actor on the 
international stage. This legitimacy has been granted to it by the people it represents 
as well as the international community. Moreover, it has allowed it to discuss all the 
core issues of the conflict with regional and international partners and to finally 
emerge from being an entity to a state at the United Nations General Assembly. The 
uniqueness of the PLO and similar national liberation movements must be a 
motivation to discuss the role of such movements particularly on the legal level and 
the right to resort to arms to achieve political goals. This very legal aspect is one of 
the details that have not been tackled effectively in the study of non-state actors. 
 
1.2 - PLO: A Non-State Actor? 
Relating to the case study, it is clear that national liberation movements can 
be considered one category of non-state actors, and the PLO is an example of such a 
movement. One of the basic concerns of this thesis is to discuss the PLO from the 
perspective of being an effective non-state actor and political player. This is actually 
what has not been discussed explicitly on the PLO. A question can be asked in this 
respect: On what basis is the PLO categorized as an influential non-state actor?  
I would say that the PLO has been historically effective and has succeeded in 
gaining legitimacy not only from the Palestinian people themselves but also 
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legitimacy granted to it by the United Nations since the year 1974. First of all, the 
organization has been effective in dealing with the Palestinians‟ legitimate national 
aspirations through the course of its history because it has changed its political 
program according to regional and international political determinants. It adopted 
first the all-or-nothing approach or the total liberation of historic Palestine through 
the employment of armed struggle and operating from non-Palestinian territories. 
Then; the PLO changed its tactics and political program when it reacted to 
diplomatic initiatives during the seventies and adopted the bi-national state. When it 
deemed that this solution cannot be implemented, it shifted to the adoption of the 
two-state solution, the solution that has marked the course of the conflict since early 
1990s till now through American-sponsored negotiations. Moreover, when 
international conditions were viewed suitable by the PLO, it took a unilateral step 
and addressed the United Nations and succeeded in getting the status of a non-
member observer state at the UNGA. Therefore, these continuous changes in the 
political program of the PLO in order to achieve legitimate Palestinian aspirations 
rendered it an effective non-state actor on the international stage, a fact that puts the 
realist paradigm under question.  
 
1.3- The Importance of Investigating This Topic 
Why is the topic of non-state actors important to investigate? It is set clear 
that the study of international relations have primarily centered on states and their 
role as well as the struggles among states to attain more power in order to secure 
their national interests and resources. Nevertheless, non-state actors are gaining more 
and more importance in the sense that “states are not only losing autonomy in a 
globalizing economy, but also sharing powers – including political, social, and 
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security roles at the core of sovereignty – with business, international organizations, 
and a multitude of citizens groups, known as non-governmental organizations” 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977).  The National Intelligence Council of the United States 
defines the term “non-state actors” as “non-sovereign entities that exercise 
significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national and at 
international levels” (National Intelligence Office, 2007). Such a definition is crucial 
because it covers a wide range of non-sovereign entities that could range from 
criminal networks, guerilla groups or terrorists to NGOs or multinational 
organizations and institutions. In her article “The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of 
Non-State Actors and the Public Diplomacy Concept” (2012) Teresa La Porte, says 
that “the proliferation of non-state actors is transforming international relations. 
Some consequences of globalization, such as the crisis of the state or the impact of 
new technologies, or the emergence of powerful civil society, have multiplied 
players acting in the global sphere (La Porte, 2012, p. 4). She also adds that the role 
they are assuming is significant and undeniable because they are empowered by huge 
financial, technological, and political resources previously monopolized by states 
(La Porte, 2012). These non-state actors have been very active on the international 
stage because they have been playing important roles by defining new rules, 
monitoring human rights violations, acting effectively in the humanitarian and 
environmental fields, developing civil society organizations, think tanks, students 
and labor unions, religious groups, transnational companies even sometimes 
“radically modifying security parameters (as al-Qaeda has done)” (La Porte, 2012, p. 
4). 
In some other examples of non-state actors such as the case of separatist 
groups or national liberation movements, these non-state actors have succeeded in 
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gaining international legitimacy, autonomy and independence; many examples can 
be given in this respect such as the case study in this thesis the “PLO”. The Palestine 
Liberation Organization started as a national liberation movement whose some of its 
actions were condemned by the international community at certain times but also 
whose actions have made the international community responds to address its 
national aspirations. Geoffrey Wiseman introduces a new concept or model called 
“polylateralism” in Polylateralism and New Modes of Global Dialogue (2004) 
whereby he elaborates on the new relations between states and non-state actors 
because he realizes that they do coexist and react in a globalized interdependent 
world. Therefore and resorting to La Porte‟s words, non-state actors have been 
“setting agendas, creating issues, shaping rules, collaborating in the decision-making 
and implementation processes, and monitoring actions and outcomes” (La Porte, 
2012, p. 5). The author says this because she fully realizes that non-state actors have 
been playing an important role and have been offering expertise and knowledge that 
surpasses states sometimes.  
Therefore, the leading role of non-state actors has consolidated itself after 
World War Two, and it is wrong to turn a blind eye to them. Any comprehensive 
school of thought in international relations has to include them as an integral part; 
otherwise it will be lacking. Moreover, their role and place in the international 
system cannot be summarized as being tools in the hands of states as realism and 
neo-realism suggest. They have to be included in a coherent perspective that 
adequately defines what non-state actors are, categorizes them, and realizes and 
interprets their roles in the different fields. Such a grand theory of international 
relations that succeeds in including non-state actors cannot be complete unless the 
legal status of such actors is addressed. This status should be clearly mentioned in 
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the UN Charter in order to organize and legalize their work via formulation codes of 
conducts to them, institutionalizing their role, and enhancing their abilities in policy 
and law making processes.  
 
1.4- Thesis Question 
This thesis intends to demonstrate the significant and undeniable role of non-
state actors in world politics through shedding light on the failure of the state-centric 
theory and other political theories to address them adequately. Actually, the growing 
numbers of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, multinational 
corporations, international organizations, as well as transnationally organized groups 
accompanying decolonization especially in post World War Two era pose a real 
challenge to the obsolete-state centric paradigm. Palestine Liberation Organization 
will be taken as a case study in two drastic periods of its history; the first is the 
period of armed struggle while the second is the organization‟s diplomatic work. In 
order to be theoretical and logical in discussing the role of non-state actors, they will 
be discussed in terms of the liberal school of thought.  
Therefore and in addition to the point discussed above, the thesis will answer 
the following question: From a liberal approach how does the example of the PLO in 
its employment of arms and diplomacy challenges the state-centric concept? In 
answering this question, I will demonstrate my argument in highlighting two main 
points: the first is challenging the concept of the state-centric which gives 
prominence to states exclusively; the second point is pinpointing the efficient role of 
non-state actors in a globalized interdependent world as well as the urgent need to 
include them in a grand political theory and working on enhancing their legal status. 
To apply the theoretical findings and to answer the research question, the case study 
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is taken as a methodology in the thesis. An interview will be conducted too in order 
to reinforce my argument. 
 
1.5- Map of Thesis 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter comprises an 
introduction and the main contours particularly why the topic of non-state actors is 
important to investigate. Also, chapter one elaborates briefly on the right of national 
liberation movements to use arms and the importance of regulating their use of force 
under International Humanitarian Law. Chapter two examines the state-centric 
paradigm in addition to other schools of thought and locates the position of non-state 
actors in these various schools and finally points out to the fact that they are not 
included as influential effective actors on the international stage. In addition, chapter 
two points out to the aspects that have not been described and explained (mainly the 
legal aspect) on the study of non-state actors. Chapter three is an overview of the 
history of the PLO; this overview serves to shed light on the efficiency of non-state 
actors through the organization‟s political program. Chapter four elaborates the 
liberal-pluralist approach to world politics and the way it defines non-state actors and 
elaborates their qualities and role. Here, my case study will serve to describe the 
undeniable role of these actors through focusing again on the PLO‟s operations 
during the armed struggle period and diplomatic period. The final chapter will assess 
whether the organization has been successful or not in promoting its cause in both 
stages in addition it will furnish the significance of this study and whether it 
contributes to the already existing studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Actors in International Relations Theories 
 
2.1- Introduction 
Chapter two examines the main schools of thought in international relations 
and locates the position of non-state actors in these various schools. Such an 
examination helps in shedding light on the fact that non-state actors have not been 
included as effective and influential actors on the international stage. At the 
beginning of this chapter, the term “actor” is defined and given its major 
characteristics. The second part will be an examination of the basic paradigms or 
schools of thought to locate the place of non-state actors as well as their role. The 
last section demonstrates the legal status of non-state actors and the urgent need to 
accommodate them in the United Nations and formation of codes of conduct to 
institutionalize and legalize their role. 
One of the most prominent characteristics of the international political system 
in the second half of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty first has been 
the significant rise in numbers and importance of non-state actors. As a matter of 
fact, they have been playing a leading role world- wide not only in the fields of 
human rights, environmental matters, and humanitarian issues but also in political 
realms that include negotiations and decision-making processes such as national 
liberation movements and rights of indigenous peoples.  In “Analyzing Non-State 
Actors in World Politics” (2009) Gustaaf Geeraerts says that, “with the growth of 
interdependence and communication between societies, a great variety of new 
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organizational structures, operating on a regional and global basis, have been 
established. The rise of these transnational organized non-state actors and their 
growing involvement in world politics challenge the assumptions of traditional 
approaches to international relations which assume that states are the only important 
units of the international system” (p. 1). This fact has pushed academics to realize 
that these non-sovereign entities have led to fundamental changes in world politics. 
Despite their importance, the topic of non-state actors is still controversial among 
scholars whether to treat them as distinctive autonomous bodies or as mere 
instruments of states. 
 
2.2- What is an actor? 
Before proceeding further in this discussion, a question is to be asked here: 
What is an actor in world politics? According to classical realism, “actorness” is 
defined by very specific norms mainly sovereignty, recognition of statehood, and 
control of a definite territory and people. However, this definition has been 
considered very rigid and was brought under attack by the challengers of the state-
centric approach. For example, Oran Young who came up with the so-called mixed-
actor perspective provides a definition of an actor in his essay “The Actors in World 
Politics” (1972) by saying that an actor is “any organized entity that is composed, at 
least indirectly, of human beings, is not wholly subordinate to any other actor in the 
world system in effective terms, and participates in power relationships with other 
actors” (p. 140). This definition breaks to a certain extent the hard notions of 
classical realism because the focus is not essentially on the state-related status of 
sovereignty. More recently however, an actor is defined by Evans and Newnham as 
“any entity which plays an identifiable role in international relations” (1990, p.6). 
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Nevertheless, this definition is very broad to the extent that it was subject to much 
criticism because individuals could be included in it. Brian Hocking and Michael 
Smith on the other hand contend the criteria of classical realism, and they argue that 
these criteria could be applied to nation-states only. In order to address realism‟s 
flaws, they present three different characteristics to assess international actors which 
are “autonomy, representation, and influence” (Hocking & Smith, 1990, p. 71). 
Geeraerts explains them in his article “Analyzing Non-State Actors in World 
Politics” by saying that, “autonomy refers to the degree of freedom of action that an 
actor possesses when seeking to achieve its objectives; representation refers to the 
type of constituencies that a particular actor represents; and, influence points to the 
capacity of an actor to make a difference within a certain context with regard to a 
specific issue” (Geeraerts, 2009, p. 13). To use Hocking‟s and Smith‟s terms, “From 
this revised perspective on actorness, it is possible to consider anew the qualities 
exhibited by the range of actors engaged in international relations” (Hocking & 
Smith, 1990, p. 71). This means that such less restrictive and more acceptable and 
flexible criteria provide a leeway to reconsider the different actors in world politics 
as well as their respective roles. 
Actually nation-states are considered to be the principal actors of world 
politics, but they are not the exclusive actors according to the International System 
Perspective. In fact, the international system consists not only of nation-states but of 
other entities such as universal and regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 
transnational guerilla and terrorist groups, multinational corporations, and a growing 
number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in different fields 
(East, 1978). Some international relations observers and intellectuals have noticed 
that states, as principal actors in world politics, are declining in importance, and non-
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state actors are gaining more privilege and influence. In order to explain the 
emergence of these new developments, political scientists have tried to present new 
theories such as the concept of "complex interdependence" of Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye (1989). Keohane and Nye were among the early scientists who called for 
a revision for the state-centric paradigm.  In their essay collection “Transnational 
Relations and World Politics” (1971), they identify the phenomenon of 
„transnational interaction‟ which they define as „the movement of tangible or 
intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a 
government‟ (Keohane and Nye, 1971, p. 332). According to both scientists the state 
is not necessarily the only important actor in world politics or the „gatekeeper 
between intra-societal and extra-societal flows of actions‟ (Keohane and Nye, 1971, 
pp. 722-24).  
Even though Keohane and Nye do not present a new theory of international 
relations, the authors played an underlying role in setting the foundations on which 
further studies can be conducted. They advocate "transcending the level of analysis... 
by broadening the conception of actors to include transnational actors and by 
conceptually breaking down the hard shell of the nation-state” (Keohane and Nye, 
1971, p. 730).  Another study which presents a challenge to the concept of state-
centric model is the one that was carried out by Richard Mansbach et al. In their 
study entitled “The Web of World Politics: Non-state actors in the Global System”, 
the authors argue that the state-centric paradigm has turned out to be "obsolete" due 
to the growing involvement of non-state actors in world politics (Mansbach et al., 
1976, p. 273).  Mansbach et al examine "events data" in three regions which are 
Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East from 1948 till 1972 in order to 
investigate empirically the emergence of non-state actors (Mansbach et al., 1976, pp. 
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14-15). Their findings indicate that half of the interactions in the three regions 
involve nation-states as actors and targets simultaneously and that eleven percent 
involves non-state actors exclusively (Mansbach et al, 1976).  
Kegley and Wittkoph point out that as the world grew smaller; the mutual 
dependence of nation-states and other transnational political actors on one another 
has grown (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995). The authors elaborate on the example of 
national liberation movements which are but one kind of non-state actors. These 
movements are gaining more importance on the international stage, and they have 
been playing a significant role in many parts of the globe such as Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia. Generally speaking, individuals tend to identify themselves with 
ethno-national groups besides their loyalty to nation-states. Kegley and Wittkopf say 
that “many people pledge their primary alliegances not to the state and the 
government that rules them, but rather to their ethno-national group which shares a 
common civilization, language, cultural tradition, and ties of kinship” (Kegley & 
Wittkopf, 1997, p. 175). Therefore, national liberation organizations are increasingly 
gaining importance in the international arena. 
 
2.3- Aspects of Non-State Actors 
In this section of this chapter, it is important to shed light on the important 
aspects that have not been tackled in the study of non-state actors. What are these 
aspects by and large? Despite their growing involvement in world politics and in 
different fields, many questions revolve around non-state actors especially relating to 
their legal status. It is true that these new actors have succeeded in playing 
outstanding roles in the social, economic, and political fields, sometimes even having 
the ability to change existing realities or improving and changing the existing order 
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under some circumstances, yet do they have the right to do so? Are the roles played 
by them legalized and institutionalized by the United Nations for example? Teresa 
La Porte answers these questions by saying that even though non-state actors as 
“new players offer a more reliable response to social and political issues than states, 
they have to justify on whose behalf they act, who they represent, whose interests 
they defend, and what citizens‟ rights have been delegated to them” (La Porte, 2012, 
p. 5).  
Also, according to C. Lord in his policy paper “Legitimacy, Democracy, and 
the EU: When Abstract Questions Become Practice Policy Problems” (2000), non-
state actors do not have the power to impose sanctions; they are mere instruments 
which can employ strategies of the power of persuasion or the power of attraction to 
obtain and reinforce citizen support (Lord, 2000). In La Porte‟s words, these new 
actors have not “resolved some very basic issues such as what authority they have in 
the international arena and what legitimizes them” (La Porte, 2012, p. 5). As a result, 
efficacy seems to be a decisive factor in the work of non-state actors; they have 
shown to be efficient in the way they perform their duties and the missions allocated 
to them. They “intervene and act in the international sphere, shape the political 
agenda, and suggest methods of action” (La Porte, 2012, p. 5).  
Pierre Calame puts the idea in clearer and more definitive terms in his  study 
on non-state actors conducted in 2008 by saying that “there are many aspects in 
which non-state actors appear to go beyond the reach and power of states: the global 
vocation of some NGOs surpasses the narrow-minded national interest of some 
governments; the business volume of some multinationals place them ahead of many 
countries on the planet, they have greater margin of maneuver, adapt better to new 
world realities, make better use of new technologies and can develop strategies for 
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effective influence” (Calame, 2008, quotation taken from La Porte‟s article and 
translated by her).  What can be concluded out of these arguments is that efficacy 
grants non-state actors‟ legitimacy due to their abilities in responding to civil society 
needs better than states.  Therefore, Teresa La Porte summarizes the above 
discussion by saying that: 
 “it is crucial for non-state actors to prove that they represent the common 
values of the general public, linked with universal values in the case of global 
actions 
 That their criteria or working principles be correct (transparency, 
participation, consensual decisions) correct at least in the eyes of those who 
support them: in the case of al-Qaeda democratic decisions would not matter, 
but the fulfillment of certain principles would 
 That their actions show effectiveness” (La Porte, 2012, p.7). 
 From such a perspective, the realist paradigm is put to question again. In fact 
and according to Teresa La Porte, “legitimacy is not exclusively linked to 
democratic election. It is not exclusive to states or sub-state governments that 
have won an electoral process, but it is also applicable to non-state actors. 
The distinction lies in the fact that, for non-state actors, the origin of 
legitimacy is different: it is closely linked to the moral authority the latter 
earn and is based on their capacity to resolve certain type of problem, in the 
specialized knowledge or expertise they show in exemplary quality of 
principles and values” (La Porte, 2012, p. 7).  
Realizing the importance of legalizing the role of non-state actors in the 
United Nations Charter, Bertie Ramcharan published an article entitled “Non-State 
Actors in the Future United Nations Legal Order” where she says in her introduction 
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that drastic changes have to be included in the legal order of the UN if this 
organization seeks to “live up to the expectations of peoples and if it is to adapt to 
the needs of a changing world” (Ramcharan, 1995, p. 1). She emphasizes that there 
is an urgent need to include changes in the legal order of the United Nations in 
addition to improving its role in different aspects such as monitoring human rights 
violations, humanitarian activities, peace-enforcement, peacemaking, as well as 
peacekeeping (Ramcharan, 1995). One of the most important issues that need to be 
addressed is that of non-state actors. According to the author, “non-state actors are 
rarely accorded a voice in the General Assembly (except when petitions are heard in 
the Special Committee on Decolonization). They are rarely, if ever, heard in the 
Security Council and are often unable to have their views presented to the Council 
even when their interests are directly at stake” (Ramcharan, 1995, p. 1). As a result, 
the United Nations should come up with some solutions in order to enhance the legal 
status of such actors; how can this be done?  
Bertie Ramcharan suggests at the beginning an initiation of a UN Parliament 
that would be directly elected by the peoples of the world alongside with the General 
Assembly and the Security Council. Such a parliament will play an important role in 
echoing the aspirations and expectations of the peoples of the world. Second, the 
author notes the failure of UN agencies to conform to the principles of justice in 
dealing with non-state actors whose interests were at stake under some 
circumstances; she elaborates this point by resorting to examples on countries which 
were recognized by the United Nations without any regard whatsoever for the 
position of minorities, peoples, or non-state actors whose rights and interests were 
directly affected such as the Serbs in Croatia (Ramcharan, 1995). Therefore, non-
state actors should be accommodated into the United Nations in order to give it 
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legitimacy and to enhance its work rendering it therefore credible. The author says 
that this matter should be “tackled in a holistic manner so as to deal with the root of 
the problem and to ensure that satisfactory and not simply piecemeal arrangements 
come out of the process. We are therefore inclined to view that the best manner of 
approaching legal evolution and accommodation of non-state actors would be to 
forge ahead with the establishment of a directly elected UN Parliament. Pending the 
establishment of such a directly elected body, the NGOs should periodically 
assemble themselves as the parliament of the world and issue pronouncements, 
recommendations, and prescriptions that have the moral authority of the voice of the 
peoples of the UN” (Ramcharan, 1995, p. 5). 
As already mentioned, it is very crucial to work on enhancing the legal status 
of non-state actors. In this respect, the following question poses itself and is related 
to the case study of this thesis: Was PLO‟s resort to arms at particular stages of its 
history legal while the right to use force or self-defense is exclusive to states 
according to the UN Charter? This is important to tackle because it addresses the 
failure of the United Nations to address the legitimate rights of some peoples in the 
study of national liberation movements. Addressing this point will open the door to 
seriously discuss the legal frame or the legal status of such kind of non-state actors.  
What is a war of national liberation? Higgins says that “a war of national 
liberation can be defined as the armed struggle waged by a people through its 
liberation movement against the established government to reach self-determination” 
(Higgins, 2009, p. 12). The right to self-determination has been stressed and set clear 
in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter; this right is a jus cogens and binding to all 
states according to the ICJ. Since some peoples are denied this right, this fact gives 
the pretext to national liberation movements to resort to arms in order to achieve 
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self-determination (Higgins, 2009). The case of the PLO is interesting and 
exceptional because even though the organization‟s members resorted to arms at the 
beginning, which is considered illegal according to International law, the chairman 
of the organization Arafat was invited to the UN in 1974 to deliver a speech to the 
international community on the grievances of the Palestinians and their national 
aspirations.  After his famous speech on 22 November 1974, two resolutions were 
adopted by UNGA in the same year: UNGA Resolution 3236 which contains the 
basis of recognition of the existence of the Palestinian people, of the PLO as the 
legitimate representative of that people, and of certain of their elementary rights as 
well as UNGA resolution 3237 whereby the PLO was invited to participate in the 
sessions and work of the GA as an “observer entity” in addition to participating in 
international conferences conducted by any agency under the supervision of the UN.  
Now, was this resort to arms legal? In the same article, Higgins, says that 
“the regulation of armed non-state actors is a challenge to the state-centric 
international law paradigm. The vast majority of international legal instruments 
which impact the regulation of armed actors are open to ratification by states only. 
This leads to the unfortunate situation in which armed non-state actors often fall 
outside the remit of international law and their use of force is left unregulated” 
(Higgins, 2009, p. 12). In this article, the author seeks to investigate how the use of 
arms by national liberation movements could be regulated by International 
Humanitarian Law. Such a study is an important contribution to the study of 
international relations because it addresses an aspect that has not been extensively 
studied. The author says that national liberation movements faced many difficulties 
in applying International Humanitarian Law in their conflicts due to many factors 
mainly the nature of the law itself as well as the nature of the legal framework 
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(Higgins, 2009). Higgins states in the article that, “international law, the body of law 
that governs states in their relationships with one another, generally struggles to 
accommodate non-state actors” (Higgins, 2009, p. 12). The author makes it clear that 
all the legal instruments dealing with the laws of war such as the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and international conventions such as the Ottawa Treaty of 
1997 that regulates the use of weapons were all drafted by states, and such 
instruments limit ratification to states exclusively (Higgins, 2009). Therefore and 
since national liberation movements have been active on the international stage in 
wide areas of the globe, it is important that a comprehensive International 
Humanitarian Law accommodates non-state actors. The development of such an 
International Humanitarian Law is vital for the protection of both governmental and 
liberation movements combatants and for civilians who are caught up in the middle 
of the fight (Higgins, 2009). Moreover, Higgins says that on a political level national 
liberation movements try to apply International Humanitarian Law standards in their 
conflicts to internationalize and legitimize their cause on the international stage 
(Higgins, 2009). In the early military clashes between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, history records a statement for Arafat that his militants would not attack 
Israeli casualties, but of course this has been violated by both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians during the long course of the conflict between them resulting 
unfortunately in high death tolls. Therefore, national liberation movements suffer 
from major difficulties when they try to bind themselves by International 
Humanitarian Law; therefore, there should be a serious attempt to include them in 
the United Nations Charter; other suggestions may be responding to Geneva Call and 
dialogue between states and non-state actors (Higgins, 2009). In addition to such 
solutions, it is deemed necessary to clarify to states that the “application of 
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International Humanitarian Law to a conflict does not necessarily translate into a 
threat to their territorial integrity” (Higgins, 2009, p. 16). In fact, such steps will be 
very important to encourage the application of International Humanitarian Law in 
wars of national liberation which entails a benefit to all those involved in the conflict 
(Higgins, 2009). As a result, drafting an inclusive International Humanitarian Law 
that regulates the use of arms by national liberation movements is important to 
develop a coherent legal frame of this category of non-state actors as well as other 
categories acting in different fields. 
 
2.4- International Relations Theories and the Place of Non-State 
Actors 
As a matter of fact, the main aim in this thesis is to challenge the state-centric 
paradigm or the realist approach by studying the important role of non-state actors in 
world politics and to show that they are effective in decision-making and foreign 
policy. My case study on one example of non-state actors will serve to demonstrate 
this point. To best achieve this aim, it is necessary to further investigate the different 
approaches to world politics and locate whether non-state actors do possess any role 
or influence. Bringing the realist paradigm as well as other paradigms to discussion 
in this thesis at this early stage will help to expose the flaws of the power-politics 
school of thought or realism theoretically before examining its flaws in details.  
Classical realism has gained primary importance in the discussion of world 
politics and international relations; moreover it has been tackled by many academics 
who considered it as the only effective theory to understand world order as well as 
examine the behavior of states. Geeraerts illustrates in his article entitled “Analyzing 
Non-State Actors in World Politics” that realism also known as the power-politics 
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school of thought has dominated especially after World War Two, and it has 
provided the basic assumptions for the analysis of international politics on which a 
large number of scholars and decision makers have been dependent. As a matter of 
fact, realism has emerged as a reaction to the idealist school of thought after the 
World War Two era whereby the latter‟s basic aim was the prevention of another 
world war (Geeraerts, 2009). Although the realist paradigm has faced many 
challenges, it has been revived in the 1980s under the name of neorealism 
(Geeraerts, 2009).  According to Keohane, World War Two is the main reason that 
brought the realist paradigm to the core of the Anglo-American perspective on 
international affairs (Keohane, 1986). This is also proved by Kegley and Wittkopf 
who say that the Nazis‟ pursuit of power had put into question the credibility, 
effectiveness and role of the international institutions (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989). 
In addition to World War Two, the Cold War between USSR and United States led 
most of the countries to work on reinforcing military strength because it is the only 
way to maintain peace taking that the innate drive of all states is the pursuit of 
national power (Maghoori & Ramberg, 1982).  
Geeraerts (2009) contends in his article that the development of the realist 
approach to world politics is rendered to the early works of E.H. Carr‟s The 
Twentieth Year’s Crisis in 1939 and Hans Morgenthau‟s Politics among Nations in 
1948. He adds that it is Morgenthau who used the term “political realism” in an 
attempt to challenge the idealist school of thought in international relations. The 
author adds that classical realism is based on the following three assumptions: 
1. “The state-centric assumption whereby states are the primary and only 
important actors in world politics  
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2. The rationality assumption whereby states are analyzed as if they were 
rational and unitary actors 
3. The power assumption whereby states primarily seek power, most often 
military power, as means and as an end in itself” (Geeraerts, 2009, p. 3). 
On these assumptions, Keohane says that “they provide a readily 
comprehensible set of steps to be followed by those seeking to understand and deal 
with potential threats to the security of their states” (Keohane, 1986, p. 7). Therefore, 
it is obvious from the above mentioned assumptions that power is the main aspect to 
focus on while discussing political realism. This has been previously emphasized by 
Morgenthau who contends that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle 
for power” (Morgenthau, 1949, p. 13). Morgenthau adds, “all political policy seeks 
either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (Morgenthau, 
1949, p. 21). In other words, power is the main determinant for the place of states in 
the hierarchy of the international system (Morgenthau, 1949, p. 54).To put it in 
Geeraerts‟s terms “as states alone have the necessary resources to exercise power, 
they are consequently the most important actors” (Geeraerts, 2009, p. 3). Therefore, 
Russett and Starr conclude that the state acts, through its government by adopting the 
cost and benefit policy, as a unitary rational actor pursuing its national interests and 
competing with other nation states in the anarchical international arena in order to 
secure and maximize its interests (Russett & Starr, 1989).  
In the midst of this hard shell of the realist paradigm other entities on the 
international stage do not have place especially that the realist approach has strictly 
defined the three main criteria of actors in world politics. These criteria can be 
defined as sovereignty, recognition of statehood, and the control of territory and 
population which are exclusively applied to nation states. To conclude, transnational 
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and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, national liberation 
movements, guerilla and terrorist groups are not considered at all in classical realism. 
Such entities even international organizations like the United Nations are mere 
instruments of states with a minimal effect on nation-state interactions (Grieves, 
1979). “Realism therefore and according to Young “is based on essentially 
homogenous political systems with regard to type of actor” (Young, 1972, p. 126). 
A reaction to realism‟s basic assumptions started to emerge by the 1970s and 
seemed to predict the demise of the realist approach. Nevertheless, a number of 
international events took place during the late 1970s and early 1980s such as East-
West tensions, Soviet-American arms race, military intervention and counter-
intervention by the superpowers in Africa, Central America, and Southwest Asia, 
Yom Kippur or 1973 October War, and Iran- Iraq Wars gave the pretext that realism 
is still fundamental in understanding world politics. In addition to these political 
circumstances, neither did international institutions succeed in reshaping state 
interests nor did the integration process of West Europe serve to overcome trade and 
monetary conflicts among West European countries as well as economic relations 
with the Soviet Union (Grieco, 1988). These events led to the reemergence of 
realism under the new “guise”, of neorealism (Hollis & Smith, 1992).  
Kenneth Waltz, believed to be the godfather of this new trend of neorealism 
in international relations, presented his crucial work Theory in International Politics 
in 1979. Keohane described Waltz‟s work by saying that the “significance of Waltz‟s 
theory… lies less in his initiation of a new line of theoretical inquiry or speculation 
than his attempt to systemize political realism into a rigorous, deductive systematic 
theory of international politics” (Keohane, 1986, p. 15). In Evans and Newnham 
words Waltz‟s work is the “most far reaching theoretical attempt so far to 
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reestablish, albeit in a more rigorous form, the central tenets of realism” (Evans & 
Newnham, 1990, p. 341). A question has to be asked in this respect and related to 
this thesis; what is the position of non-state actors in Waltz‟s approach? By and 
large, his approach to non-state actors does not drastically differ from classical 
realism. What Kenneth Waltz does in his study is a process of “systemizing” 
classical realism into a systemic theory (Waltz, 1979, p. 68). According to him 
systems theories can be defined as “theories that explain how the organization of a 
realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it” 
(Waltz, 1979, p. 72). This means that the determinants of a systemic theory identify 
the relationships between certain aspects of the system and actor behavior 
(Geeraerts, 2009).  
For Waltz, a system is composed of a structure and interacting units. He 
describes the structure of the international system by anarchy and by the interaction 
among its units which are the states; moreover he considers that even though states 
differ in terms of many criteria such as wealth, power, size, and form, they are 
functionally the same (Waltz, 1979). He adds that the only variable element of the 
international structure is the distribution of power across the system‟s units i.e states; 
hence, the structure of the international system will change when the distribution of 
power among states changes (Waltz, 1979). To put this in Waltz‟s words, “In 
defining international-political structures we take states with whatever traditions, 
habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have. We do not ask 
whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, 
ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their 
capabilities” (Waltz, 1979, p. 99).  
26 
 
Why does Waltz choose states as the principle actors of the international 
system? He argues by saying that the international system cannot be defined by all 
actors within it but only by the significant ones (Waltz, 1979). For him, it is the units 
of the biggest capacities that will “set the scene of action for others as well as for 
themselves” (Waltz, 1979, p. 72). To put this idea once again in Waltz‟s 
terminology, “states set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage 
their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere 
little in the affairs of non-state actors for long periods of time, states nevertheless set 
the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting informal rules to 
develop or by actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them; when the 
crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate” (Waltz, 1979, 
p. 94).  
To put this discussion into a nutshell, Waltz does not ignore the importance 
of non-state actors but insists on the significance and indispensability of the state-
centric conception; he actually re-emphasizes the major tenets of classical realism 
but on a genuine scientific basis. In other words and according to him, “states are the 
units whose interactions form the structure of the international-political systems. 
They will long remain so. The death rate among states is remarkably low. Few states 
die; many firms do. Who is likely to be around 100 years from now, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, Thailand, and Uganda or Ford, IBM, Shell, 
Unilever, and Massey-Fergusson? I would bet on the states, perhaps even on 
Uganda” (Waltz, 1979, p.95).  
Kenneth Waltz and other neorealists pointed out the major flaw of other 
theories which draw the audience‟s attention to non-state actors mainly the pluralist 
approach. They believe that these pluralists have by and large succeeded in 
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indicating the changes in world politics specifically the growing involvement of non-
state actors; nevertheless they did not actually put these changes into a coherent 
theoretical approach or framework. As Sullivan argues, pluralists should be “as 
interested in explaining the changes as in simply pointing them out” (Sullivan, 1982, 
p.260). 
Before turning to discuss actors in the liberal-pluralist paradigm, the scope 
under which I will examine my case study in the thesis, it is crucial though to shed 
light on the mixed-actor perspective that was brought to focus by Oran Young during 
the seventies and elaborated in a clearer and more coherent way later on by James 
Rosenau. Young challenged the state-centric paradigm of analyzing world politics 
and said that a mixed actor approach requires stepping away from the basic notion of 
the types of actors which means challenging the state as the principle actor in world 
politics. For Young, there is an increasing complexity and diversity in the 
international system which entails an approach that emphasizes the interaction 
between different types of actors regardless of any kind of dominance or hierarchical 
relationships (Young, 1972). To put this idea in his words, the author says that, 
“Given the diversity of the component units, the qualitatively different types of 
political relationships, and the prospects for extensive interpretations among actors 
in systems of mixed actors, it is to be expected that such systems will be highly 
dynamic ones… in this sense also, the mixed-actor world view tends to involve 
greater complexity than the state-centric view” (Young, 1972, pp. 136-137).  
Though Oran Young does not announce the demise of states in his approach, 
he elaborates that they are not the dominant actors in world politics. Therefore, he 
directly challenges the main characteristics of states which are sovereignty, 
legitimacy, recognition as well as the use of force. Indeed, Young sets a significant 
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departure from classical realism though he did not succeed in developing a new 
theory based on variety of actors where non-state actors play a dynamic influential 
role. In other words, neither did he categorize these non-state actors, nor did he 
explicitly mention the role of these actors in world politics and international 
relations. Nevertheless, his work allowed academics to conduct important steps 
towards challenging the state-centric concept, and this is obviously noted with James 
Rosenau who is considered to be the spokesman for change in the traditional models 
of the international system and from breaking away from what he calls “the 
conceptual jails” of the state-centric paradigm (Rosenau, 1990, pp. 5-6).  
In fact, Roseneau develops Young‟s attempt as well as other early pluralist 
attempts in his prominent book Turbulence in World Politics in 1990. “By bringing 
many of these earlier pluralist developments together, he presents an integrated 
paradigm for the analysis of an international system where non-state actors are direct 
participants” (Geeraerts, 2009). In his book Turbulence in World Politics, Rosenau 
says that political turbulence, technological advancement as well as increasing 
interaction among societies characterize the post-industrial era, and this has led to 
profound changes in the functioning of world politics (Roseanau, 1990). Therefore, 
James Rosenau believes that the state-centric paradigm is no longer effective in 
addressing these drastic changes, so there has to be a new formula or framing of a 
new postulate to assess the changing form of world order (Rosenau, 1990). He in 
fact, talks about the “two worlds of world politics” (Rosenau, 1990, p. 247). What 
does this new term mean? Rosenau means that there is “an autonomous multi-centric 
world, which includes sovereignty – free actors, that competes and interacts with the 
old state-centric world characterized by states and their interactions” (Rosenau, 
1990, p. 247). According to Rosenau, this multi-centric world can exist because the 
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relevance of actors is determined not by the classical criteria of their legal status or 
sovereignty rather by the states‟ ability to undertake and sustain actions (Rosenau, 
1990). Rosenau argues in his book Turbulence in World Politics that though the two 
worlds of world politics; that is sovereignty – free actors and state – centric, can be 
analytically separated, they overlap due to the increasing interdependence and 
transnational activites (Rosenau, 1990). He points out that “the point is to distinguish 
between two separate sets of complex actors that overlap and interact even as they 
also maintain a high degree of independence” (Rosenau, 1990, p. 252). Therefore, 
James Rosenau attempted to formulate an integrated general theory in which both 
state and non-state actors coexist; the significance of his work is his attempt to merge 
realist and pluralist elements into a single theory (Geeraerts, 2009). Though his work 
is fundamental in the realm of international relations, it suffers from some 
weaknesses. According to Gustaaf Geeraerts, the major flaw in his work is that he 
does not clearly categorize international actors. “While acknowledging the growing 
diversity and importance of sovereignty free actors in the multi-centric world, he 
does not clearly distinguish the different categories of non-state actors. This is in fact 
one of the major deficiencies of the pluralist paradigm in general. Few scholars agree 
on what units should be included under the rubric of non-state actors” (Geeraerts, 
2009, p. 11). 
As a conclusion, it can be said that while classical realism is “conceptually 
jailed” by the exclusivity of nation-states as the principal actors of world politics and 
abandoning any role for non-state actors, neo-realism reestablishes the central 
characteristics of realism and hence fails as well to point out to the role and 
effectiveness of non-state actors in the international realm. The mixed-actor 
perspective on the other hand succeeded in realizing the significance of these non-
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sovereign entities in a globalized interdependent world. Though this paradigm tried 
to merge the role of state and non-state actors in a single integrated postulate, the 
mixed-actor concept failed to identify the typology and categories of non-state actors 
thereby rendering this perspective lacking. 
 
2.5- Early Liberal Attempts and Non-State Actors 
It is deemed important to discuss the place of non-state actors in the light of 
the liberal-pluralist perspective. Liberal-pluralists have challenged the state-centric 
approach and called for a pluralist paradigm in order to evaluate the changes and 
transformations in global politics. They believe that realism has provided “a narrow 
and incomplete description and explanation of world affairs” (Mansbach & Vasquez, 
1981, p. 6), and it was the notion of state predominance that they brought under 
direct attack in the first place. 
Early attempts were undertaken by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye who 
were among the first academics to challenge the state centric paradigm in their essay 
collection “Transnational Relations and World Politics”. Actually, they point out to 
the increasing significance of non-governmental actors in a great number of 
international interactions. Moreover, they furnish their collection with a number of 
case studies such as multinational corporations, revolutionary movements, labor 
unions, and scientific networks (Keohane & Nye, 1971). Although, they do not 
present the audience with a new theory, they set the foundations for future research 
based on the principle of diversity of actors. In their words, “they advocate 
transcending the level of analysis… by broadening the conception of actors to 
include transnational actors and by conceptually breaking down the hard shell of the 
nation-state” (Keohane & Nye, 1971, p. 730). To highlight Keohane‟s and Nye‟s 
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observations, Kjell Skjelsbaek (1971) gathered empirical data in “The Growth of 
International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century”. In his 
study, he highlights the rapid growth of international non-governmental 
organizations since 1900 and specifically in the post World War II era. While the 
number of international nongovernmental organizations increased on an average of 
4.7% from 1954 to 1968, the annual growth rate was 6.2% between 1962 and 1968 
(Skjelsbaek, 1971, p. 425). In his examination of the distribution of these actors by 
field of activity, Skjelsbaek noticed that the categories of economic/financial 
organizations and commercial/industrial organizations constituted the greatest 
percentage of organizations established in the period between 1945 and 1954 
(Skjelsbaek, 1971, p. 429).  
After Skjelsbeak, political scientists continued to conduct empirical studies 
on the relevance of non-state actors. For example in 1976 Richard Mansbach et al. 
conducted an important study entitled “The Web of World Politics: Non-state Actors 
in the Global System”. They argue that they state-centric model has become 
“obsolete” and unable to effectively interpret the rapid changes in the international 
arena; they also add that this paradigm totally ignores the growing involvement of 
non-state actors in international relations. In order to reinforce their point on the 
emergence and behavior of non-state actors, the two authors rely on events that took 
place from 1948 till 1972 in three parts of the globe mainly Western Europe, the 
Middle East, and Latin America. They draw conclusions which indicate that “half of 
the interactions in the mentioned regions involve nation-states as actors and targets 
simultaneously and that eleven percent involve non-state actors exclusively” 
(Mansbach et al., 1976, p. 275). Therefore and according to them, “only half of the 
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dyads can be analyzed from a state-centric point of view because the remaining half 
of the combinations include non-state actors” (Mansbach et al., 1976, p. 276). 
After this important study, John Vasquez and Richard Mansbach (1981) did 
an explorative work on non-state actors entitled “In Search of Theory: A New 
Paradigm for Global Politics”. They resort to examples that include interactions 
between American-based and West German-based actors between 1949 and 1975 
(Mansbach & Vasquez, 1981). Their study is divided into two parts; in the first part 
of their study, the two authors rank the order of actors that they use in data collection 
according to the “frequency of their behavior” (Mansbach & Vasquez, 1981, p. 16). 
In the second part of the study, Mansbach and Vasquez “investigate the rank order of 
actors by percent of conflict they initiate and receive to indicate that non-state actors 
are not only present but also significant in world politics” (Mansbach & Vasquez, 
1981, pp. 17-19). Therefore, what the two academics want to stress is that classical 
realism is a misleading approach to understand how world politics operates because 
it neglects the importance and diversity of non-state actors. To put their findings in 
their words: “The neglect of actor variation and diversity within the realist paradigm 
leads to distortions that not only make that paradigm something less than complete, 
but also theoretically unsatisfactory. An alternative paradigm will be scientifically 
promising only if it can offer variables that will be more fruitful than those 
encountered in the power politics paradigm in explaining global behavior” 
(Mansbach & Vasquez, 1981, p. 26). 
Mansbach‟s and Vasquez‟s conclusion takes us again to Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye (1977) who attempted to challenge classical realism to show its 
inadequacy, and this what they really do in their book Power and Interdependence. 
According to many critics, this book is one of the most influential works which tried 
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to develop an alternative scientific pluralistic paradigm to classical realism. It is in 
this book that they come up with the concept of “complex interdependence” based 
on clear definitions. Keohane and Nye define this term as the “multiple channels that 
connect societies including inter-state, trans-governmental and transnational 
relations” with an agenda “consisting of multiple issues that are not arranged in a 
clear and consistent hierarchy and with economic interests on the same footing as 
military ones” (Keohane & Nye, 1977, pp. 24-25). As a result, the definition of 
“complex interdependence” challenges the main characteristics of classical realism 
which are: sovereignty, recognition of statehood, and the control of territory and 
population. To be more specific, they claim that: 
 states are not the exclusive actors in world politics nor are they the sole 
unitary actors because they include competing bureaucracies  
 military might is no more the suitable tool of policy 
 there is no clear hierarchy of issues thereby replacing the old notion which 
gives priority for military/ security matters over economic/ social ones 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977, pp. 24-25) 
Hence, and based on the concept of “complex interdependence” of Keohane 
and Nye, non-state actors are direct participants in global politics. The authors say 
that many non-state actors such as private banks and multinational corporations have 
become “a normal part of foreign as well as domestic relations” (Keohane & Nye, 
1977, p. 26). They add that such actors “act as transmission belts, making 
government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another” (Keohane & 
Nye, 1977, p. 26). Concerning political processes, non-state actors or transnational 
actors, as Keohane and Nye like to use, “will introduce different goals into various 
groups of issues” (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 30). To consolidate their argument on 
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non-state actors, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye say that states will employ these 
non-state actors or transnational actors as tools to obtain power. The authors suggest 
therefore that political bargaining will be influenced by transnational relations 
especially when the situation comes close to the concept of interdependence 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977). Indeed, Keohane and Nye‟s concept of complex 
interdependence is crucial in developing a pluralistic paradigm, and it is a competing 
model to other approaches. But, again they fail to make their theory coherent and 
general. Still their contribution to understanding global politics sets the founding 
stone on which other studies can be conducted. 
 
2.6- The Legal Status of Non-State Actors 
The above discussion attempts to shed light on the place and role of non-state 
actors in the different political approaches to world politics, and it is now obvious 
that their role varies according to the approach to international relations. While they 
are mere instruments in the hands of states in classical realism and neo-realism, non-
state actors have a significant position in the liberal- pluralist paradigm and the 
mixed-actor perspective. Despite that they have been tackled extensively by political 
scientists and the realm of foreign policy, their legal status is still not clear; in other 
words “it is often stated that their impact is still inadequately reflected in 
international law or in the formal structure of the international institutions” 
(Franssen, 1995, p. 152). Edith Franssen argues in “Overview of Literature on the 
Actual Role of Non-State Actors in the International Community” (1995) that non-
state actors should be brought into the scope of international institutions in order to 
increase the legitimacy of those institutions. She renders this to many reasons. First 
and most importantly, non-state actors are playing crucial roles in the fields of 
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health, education, and welfare sometimes even substituting the role of governments 
especially in “failing states” (Franssen, 1995). Second, they monitor human rights 
violations because sometimes governments are not credible in holding accountable 
the practices of other states, groups or even states‟ own political elite in terms of 
such violations; in Franssen‟s words, “states generally do not like to criticize other 
states for the violation of human rights, because they are afraid that this may have a 
backfiring effect” (Franssen, 1995, p. 156). Third, non-state actors and particularly 
NGOs can act flexibly and independently regardless of political restrictions; they can 
act immediately on matters such as environmental issues or play a humanitarian role 
in conflict situations through mediation and reconciliation (Franssen, 1995).  
An example can help to elucidate Franssen‟s discussion. During the Cold 
War, NGOs were able to “establish an early presence in conflict situations, thereby 
contributing to stabilize volatile situations and providing early warning to incite the 
international community to act quickly” (Franssen, 1995). For these reasons and 
more, the status of non-state actors should be enhanced legally; therefore, shutting 
them out will decrease the legitimacy of international institutions like the UN 
(Franssen, 1995). A question is to be asked in this respect, how could their status be 
enhanced? Franssen argues in the same article that the status of non-state actors 
could be enhanced in several ways because it is set clear that their role cannot be 
ignored in international relations and world politics. She points out to multiple ways 
to achieve this aim, and they can be summarized as follows. First, the legal status 
could be reinforced and enhanced through codifying their role by United Nations 
agencies like in international treaties especially treaties which monitor human rights 
violations.  
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What does codification mean though? For Franssen, codification means the 
formation of codes of conduct for them. This is very important because it relates 
directly to the case study in this thesis which is the PLO. As a matter of fact, 
codification concerns mostly national liberation movements because such 
movements consider themselves legitimate representatives of peoples and causes. To 
put this idea in her words, “It is difficult to decide whether such groups operate on 
the basis of a political program or whether they are purely criminal such as the 
Mafia. Political groups may engage in criminal activities to support their cause like 
the PLO, while criminal groups may opt for some kind of semi-political control, like 
for example ETA in North Spain” (Franssen, 1995, p. 158). This in turn entails 
including non-state actors in decision-making processes and foreign policy through 
institutionalizing their role. Second, the author speaks of de facto participation for 
non-state actors, and this mainly concerns non-state actors as NGOs which are active 
in education, health, and human welfare.  
Finally, Franssen talks about the importance of having these non-state actors 
represented in international forums like world conferences and intergovernmental 
forums; they should be able to deliver their points of view and suggestions 
(Franssen, 1995, pp. 158-159). To put this discussion into a nutshell, Franssen 
contends that, “As non-state actors are brought into the fold of entities recognized by 
international law they should face duties as well as rights. As a condition for 
participation in any UN body, non-state actors might be required to subscribe to a 
code of conduct. This may imply some loss of independence but that is an inevitable 
implication of power responsibility exercised” (Franssen, 1995, p. 158). She adds, 
“Non-state actors sometimes form coalitions to increase their impact. By belonging 
to a coalition that has systematic relations with UN organs, a non-state actor enjoys 
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additional legitimacy as well as an increased opportunity to influence the decision-
making of that UN body” (Franssen, 1995, p. 159). 
 
2.7- Conclusion 
It is crucial to reiterate the leading role played by non-state actors in world 
politics basically since the end of World War Two. Non-state actors have not been 
marginal at all to the extent that they were included in the approaches that attempted 
to offer the audience a comprehensive coherent theory that seeks in turn to include 
the different and diverse aspects of the international system. Theories that turned a 
blind eye to non-state actors or that summarized their role to mere tools have shown 
to be lacking and inadequate. For this reason, political scientists were obliged to look 
for a perspective that includes them in order to better interpret the multiple roles they 
play in different fields, and they succeeded to include them in the liberal- pluralist 
paradigm and partially in the mixed-actor perspective. They also sought to provide 
the interested audience with a categorization or a typology of these non-state actors; 
the traditional classification distinguishes between two major types: international 
governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs). These two grand categories were initially recognized 
alongside with the traditional state actors. Later on the scope has widened to include 
transnational organizations, multinational corporations, national liberation 
movements, guerilla and terrorist groups, and epistemic communities. In addition to 
the theoretical dealing with the topic of non-state actors, there is also the legal status 
of these actors. Many academics suggest that their legal status must be enhanced for 
the reasons that were tackled above. The legal enhancement includes formation of 
codes of conduct for them, institutionalizing their role, engaging them in policy-
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making and law-making, as well as setting them on the basis of legal rights and 
duties.  
This extensive study of the theoretical and the legal status of non-state actors 
done by academics and political scientists demonstrate that the presence and the role 
of non-state actors should not be ignored. It also helps to lay the proper groundwork 
for the case study in this thesis, the PLO as an important non-state actor. Actually, 
these discussions make the study of the case of the PLO relevant not only because 
the PLO has been the spokesman of the Palestinian cause and acting on behalf of the 
Palestinians since its initiation but also to show that the PLO and similar non-state 
actors do have a place in the international arena, a place that has to be recognized 
and included in any comprehensive logical theory. The thesis in chapter three turns 
to having an overview of the history of the PLO to demonstrate how non-state actors 
can be efficient through focusing on the organization‟s political program.   
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CHAPTER 3 
The Creation of the PLO 
 
3.1- Introduction 
While chapter two examines the research on the state-centric paradigm and 
other schools of thought and locates the position of non-state actors, chapter three 
briefly narrates the history of the PLO to demonstrate that it has been an effective 
non-state actor.  Non-state actors function on many levels such as the humanitarian 
level or participate in monitoring state actions, law-making, and policy-making; on 
the other hand such actors like national liberation movements have been recognized 
as representatives of some people to the extent of enjoying some privileges within 
the United Nations.  
Therefore, as will be argued in this and later chapters, their legal status 
should be seriously addressed through codifying them in treaties or be explicitly 
mentioned in the United Nations Charter in terms of legalizing their role and setting 
some codes of conduct for them (rights and duties); eventually this would entail a 
greater legitimacy of the UN as an international institution. 
The PLO is a national liberation movement which has been acting on behalf 
of the Palestinians since its creation in 1965 and has been an active player regionally 
and internationally .While non a state, the PLO was legitimized by the United 
Nations in 1974 when it gained an observer status and when it was legally asserted 
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. While it employed armed 
struggle at a particular stage of its history, it underwent a shift in its political 
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program and techniques since the early stages when it sought other solutions to 
conflict with the Israelis, a fact that climaxed with the Palestinian acceptance of 
Jewish presence on Palestinian land and manifested in the peace talks between the 
disputing parties. Moreover, the PLO took a unilateral step and addressed the United 
Nations Security Council and General Assembly and succeeded in getting the status 
of a non-member observer state therefore upgrading its legal status notably. 
Throughout the organization‟s history, the PLO has lobbied regional and 
international powers to help it achieve its aims; it has been affected by international 
events, and it has reacted to diplomatic initiatives from different parties. In addition 
to all this, it has designed its policies and strategies according to the events of the 
time (adopted a maximalist approach or an all-or nothing position in the very early 
stages, responded to diplomatic initiatives during the seventies, adopted defensive 
strategies especially in 1982, and turned to diplomacy after 1991 Madrid 
Conference). This serves to spotlight the following two ideas: The first is 
demonstrating that non-state actors do possess a place in world politics and can act 
as decision-makers sometimes. The second point is that this case study reinforces the 
necessity of addressing the legal status of non-state actors. In other terms, the 
international codes of conduct are necessary to put non-state actors in front of strict 
obligations, rights, and duties. 
 
3.2- Historical Overview 
It is now set very clear that the conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the 
Jews has a historical and a political context. In fact, the Palestine-Israel conflict is 
one of the most complicated dilemmas that have been facing the international 
community since 1948. The ongoing conflict between both parties is the result of the 
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search for national identity and self-determination of two different ethno nationalist 
groups in the context of many significant events that have taken place, most 
importantly the development of the concepts of statehood and nationalism. These 
two concepts constitute the basic drive for both the Israelis and the Palestinians and 
have been the source of the wars and the violent armed clashes between them.  
While the independent State of Israel was proclaimed on the 15
th
 of May 
1948, the Palestinians have been struggling since that time to have their own viable 
independent state and to realize their aspiration of self-determination. Moreover, the 
Palestine-Israel conflict has been the major conflict that shaped the Middle East in 
the past five decades in the sense of the rise of non-state actors such as the PLO and 
armed militias, increasing militarization in the region, rise of fundamentalist Islam, 
regional wars, retaliatory attacks and bombardments, and robust authoritarianism in 
the Middle East and North Africa (before the current wave of the so-called “Arab 
Spring”).  
Actually, the conflict between them has passed through many phases, and it 
dates to the 1917 Balfour Declaration whereby the British Lord Balfour promised the 
Jews a land in Palestine. Nevertheless, the violent clashes between them started in 
1948, the year that marked the establishment of the State of Israel where as for the 
Palestinians it is known as “al-Nakba” or the Catastrophe. Avi Shlaim, a professor of 
International Relations at the University of Oxford and a fellow of the British 
Academy writes in The Iron Wall (2001) that “the state of Israel was born in the 
midst of a war with the Arabs of Palestine and neighboring Arab States” (Shlaim, 
2001,  p. 28). It should be noted that Shlaim is a new historian who has a critical 
interpretation of the history of Zionism and Israel. After the official establishment of 
the State of Israel in 1948, the clashes between the indigenous Palestinians and the 
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Jewish new inhabitants started especially after the issuing of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 181 that claimed the partition of Palestine into two states, an 
Arab State and a Jewish one; Israel at this stage occupied the land that was allocated 
for the Palestinians according to the Partition Plan. In 1949 after the signing of the 
so-called armistice agreements, Gaza Strip was put under the Egyptian control where 
as the West Bank was placed under Jordanian rule; at that time Israel occupied 
around 77% of historic Palestine.  
The hostilities between the conflicting parties resulted in a Palestinian plight 
with a serious humanitarian crisis embodied in around 750,000 Palestinians uprooted 
from their homeland thereby giving birth of what is called the “refugees problem”. It 
should be noted that Ilan Pappé, a new historian tried to explain in his book The 
Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (2006) that a planned ethnic cleansing was carried out 
in 1948. To put it in the author‟s terms, “I want to make the case for the paradigm of 
ethnic cleansing and use it to replace the paradigm of war as the basis for the 
scholarly research of, and public debate about, 1948” (Pappé, 2006, p. xvii). 
According to Pappé, 1948 is characterized by the Palestinian exodus because it led to 
the forced dislocation of around 750, 000 Palestinian which comprised at that time 
more than half of the population. Relying on Zionist leaders‟ memoires such as 
David Ben Gurion, the forced transfer of the indigenous Palestinians to neighboring 
Arab states was a main objective of the Zionist movement.  
On this specific issue, Shlaim‟s book The Iron Wall provides the readers with 
an elaborated account of the very early Zionist leaders ideology and strategies such 
as Theodore Herzl, Chaim Weizmann, Ze‟ev Jabotinsky, and David Ben Gurion. For 
instance, Shlaim elaborates on Jabotinsky‟s policy regarding the Arab question 
which is “erecting an iron wall of Jewish military force” (Shlaim, 2001, p. 14); it 
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should be noted that Jabotinsky is considered to be a prominent Jewish nationalist 
and the founder of Revisionist Zionism, and “the spiritual father of the Israeli right” 
(Shlaim, 2001, p. 11).  Another example in Shlaim‟s book is the memoires of David 
Ben Gurion who is the founder of the State of Israel and where the transition toward 
the strategy of the iron wall is best illustrated (Shlaim, 2001). David Ben Gurion 
said, 'I am for compulsory transfer; I do not see anything immoral in it” (Pappé, 
2006, p. xi). Therefore, Ilan Pappé says that there was a planned ethnic cleansing 
known as “Plan Dalet or Plan D” and was put into action through the demolition of 
more than 500 Palestinian villages as well as several armed assaults and massacres 
executed by Zionist groups mainly the Haganah and the Irgun. To use Pappé‟s 
words, Plan D meant then “'bombarding villages…setting fire to homes, properties 
and goods, expulsion, demolition and planting mines among the rubble to prevent 
any of the expelled inhabitants from returning” (Pappé, 2006, p. xii). In June 1967, 
Israel launched the Six-Day War and occupied the rest of Palestine, Egyptian Sinai, 
and the Syrian Golan Heights. On November 22
nd
, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted resolution 242 which stipulated the implementation of a just and 
lasting peace in the region in addition to a just solution for the problem of the 
refugees. 
A question is to be asked in this respect? What is the relevance of this 
historic briefing? It is necessary to highlight one point which is the absence of an 
organized or coherent political entity that represents the Palestinians from 1948 till 
around 1965; actually indigenous Arab Palestinians resisted the new comers; 
nevertheless, Palestinian Arabs at that time were never equal to the Jewish migrants 
in terms of organization, availability of resources, and the use of arms. Moreover, 
this historic briefing serves to shed light on the grievances of the Palestinians and the 
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reason for the creation of the PLO and the subsequent armed revolutionary 
movement.  After the setback or the Arab Defeat of June 1967, many important 
incidents took place mainly the 1973 October War between Egypt and Israel, signing 
of 1978 Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel that is considered to be 
a critical breakthrough in the history of the conflict between the Arabs and the 
Israelis, the break out of the 1989  first Palestinian Uprising, convening of 1991 
Madrid Conference between the Arabs and the Israelis which resulted in a peace 
treaty between Jordan and Israel, signing of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between 
the Palestinians and the Israelis, and the very final phase of upgrading Palestine‟s 
status to a non-member observer state at the UNGA in 2012. 
 
3.3- The Creation of the PLO 
In between this historic course between the Arabs and the Israelis, lies the 
issue of concern in this thesis; the Palestine Liberation Organization “PLO”. The 
PLO was established first as a political organization by the late Egyptian President 
Jamal Abdul Nasser in 1964 and was meant to fill the gap in the political life of the 
Palestinians. Nevertheless and as Husam A. Mohammad argues in “The Changing 
Meaning of Statehood in PLO Ideology and Practice” (1999)  that the Arabs at that 
time wanted this organization to be an elitist organization that caters Arab interests 
thereby emphasizing its “Arab” character rather than the local character of Palestine 
and the Palestinians (Mohammad, 1999). Dissatisfaction though grew with the 
traditional role of the PLO, and it led to the emergence of an independent militant 
group in the Diaspora which called itself Palestine National Liberation Movement or 
“Fatah” under the chairmanship of Yasser Arafat which eventually led to the 
takeover of the PLO. Therefore, the “new PLO” emerged as the new leader of the 
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Palestinians in the Diaspora and acted basically to ensure the independence of 
Palestinian decision-making. Arafat and other prominent Fatah figures adopted a 
pragmatic approach or changing policies and strategies (a changing political program 
that included armed struggle at the early stages, resorting to the so called 
“revolutionary violence” in some of PLO‟s operations, bi-national state as well as 
employing diplomacy since 1991) in addressing the Palestinian cause and the 
Palestinian aspiration to self-determination, worked hard to attain their own identity 
and acted in a complicated Arab environment to ensure the independence of 
Palestinian decision-making.  
Finally Arafat and his colleagues wanted to realize a political system which 
was translated later on in establishing a Palestinian independent state with its own 
political and economic institutions. Fatah operated in a war situation and from 
territories that are not Palestinian at the beginning (Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia) 
and in 1994 it moved to the Palestinian territories, so there was no real change in its 
leadership. In other words, those who held key positions controlled Palestinian 
decision-making (Yasser Arafat and his circle). The most important factor in the mid 
of this discussion is that the organization succeeded in being legitimized by the 
United Nations when it was granted the status of an “observer entity” in 1974 in 
addition to some UNGA resolutions issued in the same year that consolidate the 
organization‟s position such as UNGA Resolutions 3236 and 3237. The PLO, as a 
non-state actor has been able to consolidate its international status and activity in the 
international arena; moreover it is a clear example of a national liberation movement 
that was legitimized by the international community. It is now obvious that the 
organization was aware of the importance of interacting with the international 
environment because as mentioned it has adopted a pragmatic approach, succeeded 
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in being the spokesman on behalf of the Palestinian people, and finally was able to 
internationalize the conflict through its changing policies and strategies. As 
mentioned above, the PLO which is a coalition of different political factions did not 
adopt a strict dogmatic view in approaching the conflict with the State of Israel and 
in addressing Palestinian aspirations. On the contrary, it has changed its policies and 
tactics, and it was able to analyze the events that took place regionally and 
internationally.  
However, how did the organization shift its strategies from total liberation to 
coexistence with Israel? It is important to answer this question in order to highlight 
the role of the organization through its history that has made it an active non-state 
actor.  By and large, PLO military strategy and political course can be divided into 
three distinct stages: 
- The all-or-nothing approach or the complete liberation phase from 1964 till 
1968 
- The secular democratic state for two peoples phase from 1969 till 1974 
- The two-state solution from 1974 till nowadays 
 Hussam Mohammad addresses this question in his article “PLO Strategy: 
From Total Liberation to Coexistence” (1997). He says that after 1967, the new PLO 
that was taken by the militant group of the Diaspora (Arafat and others) started an 
ongoing process to restructure PLO institutions, but the major early strategy adopted 
by the organization’s fedayeen (commandos or militants) is the all-or-nothing 
position or the total liberation of Palestine and the return of the refugees who were 
displaced from their homeland in the aftermath of the 1948 war. This early position 
was clearly stated in Article 10 of 1964 PLO National Covenant as well as in its 
1968 Charter (Mohammad, 1997). In addition to the military confrontations between 
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PLO militants and the Israelis, the former resorted to other tactics such as plane 
hijackings in 1969 conducted by one member of the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) another major constituent of the PLO; another example is the 
taking of Israeli athletes as hostages during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games 
conducted by a Palestinian faction known then as the Black September Organization.  
As a matter of fact, PLO leaders believed that employing “violence” would 
help the organization in drawing regional and international attention to its cause. 
Abo Iyad, one of prominent Fatah leaders commented on the Munich Operation by 
saying that “the Palestinian people imposed their presence on an international 
gathering that had sought to exclude them” (Abo Iyad, 1981). Even though some 
political blocs such as the United States of America and Britain vehemently 
condemned PLO‟s practices at that time, it can be said that the organization 
succeeded in expressing the grievances of the Palestinian people as well as urging 
the international community to seriously address Palestinian national aspirations. 
Two years after the Munich Operation, Arafat was invited to the United Nations to 
deliver a speech; the organization gained an observer status in addition to other 
resolutions that gave it legitimacy.  
After 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the PLO found it very important to start 
rethinking of the all-or-nothing policy and to react to Henry Kissinger‟s diplomatic 
initiatives as well as Geneva Convention of 1973. “Kissinger proposed a bilateral 
step-by-step plan that presented the PLO leadership with the dilemma of having to 
choose between maintaining its commitment to its traditional revolutionary policy, 
or working together with the Arab states in order not to be shut out of a settlement 
that would ignore Palestinian claims” (Mohammad, 1997, p. 2). In other words, the 
regional and international transformations and changes pushed the PLO to call for a 
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revision of its policies that alternated between maintaining commitment to “armed 
struggle” or working with the Arabs and the entire international community to find 
out satisfactory settlement that would not ignore Palestinian claims.  
In 1971 and particularly during the Palestine National Council meeting 
(PNC) even before 1973 October War between Egypt and Israel, diplomacy became 
an alternative to militancy, as long as it offered hope of success” (Mohammad, 
1997). At this stage, the idea of a secular democratic state was born, and it became 
the official policy. This proposal called for “the creation of a non-sectarian state 
secular state in which all Jewish residents who had come to Palestine prior to 1947 
would become citizens” (Mohammad, 1997, p.1). Not only was the PLO obliged to 
react to Kissinger‟s diplomatic initiatives, the organization realized then that Jewish 
presence is a reality; hence the PLO consented to share the country. Though the idea 
of the secular state was very significant and it is a clear departure from the early all-
or-nothing strategy, the organization did not abandon the idea of military 
commitment or its revolutionary image altogether due to many reasons. In fact, the 
PLO was afraid at that time that such a drastic change would affect the Palestinian 
refugees and might lead to divisions within its ranks (Mohammad, 1997). However, 
the most important thing in this changing strategy was the rise of a pragmatic trend 
within the PLO, a trend that realized the importance and the indispensability of the 
need to cope with Israeli presence through political accommodations and 
compromises (Mohammad, 1997). Yet, the idea of a secular, democratic state was 
not implemented, and the PLO continued its pragmatic realistic change of strategies 
to find a settlement that would realize Palestinian aspirations. 
In PNC‟s 12th meeting in Cairo in 1974, the PLO started to search for other 
solutions to the Palestine-Israel conflict, and there was a preliminary talk on the two- 
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state solution, the solution that has shaped all the phases of the negotiations between 
the Palestinians and the Israelis since the Madrid Conference till today. Moreover, 
the significance of this proposal lies in the fact of abandoning the previous goal of 
creating a secular, democratic, non-sectarian state all over the Palestinian territories. 
It should be noted here that the acceptance of the two-state solution by the PLO can 
be divided into two major phases: the “national authority phase from 1974 till 1977 
and the national state from 1977 till today. However, the idea or the new political 
program at that time in 1974 was creating a national authority in any part of 
Palestine that was to be liberated by armed struggle (Mohammad, 1997). “By 
introducing in 1974, the concept of the national authority as an interim solution, the 
PLO indirectly accepted diplomacy as a means for achieving its goals. Its ten-point 
program viewed the national authority as the new objective by which the 
organization could create a people‟s national, independent, and fighting sovereignty 
on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated from Israel‟s control” (Mohammad, 
1997, p. 3).  
As mentioned earlier, this new compromise to settle the conflict led to a 
division within the ranks of the PLO; PFLP or the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine decided to stick to militancy as the only method to liberate Palestine and 
formed therefore the Rejectionist Bloc or Front while Fatah with Arafat as its leader 
and its allies decided to work with moderate Arab states to realize Palestinian claims 
undeterred by the PFLP and other rejectionist voices (Mohammad, 1997). The PLO 
continued to express its readiness to compromise in the following years to solve the 
conflict with Israel; this moderate stance allowed the organization to impose itself 
and to emerge as a new political force in the Middle East. It was proclaimed as the 
“sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” in the Rabat Arab League 
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Summit of 1974, gained an observer status at the UNGA in 1974, and was able to 
build solid bridges and good relations with the Palestinian people both in the 
Diaspora and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
This regional and international recognition serves to demonstrate my point on 
how a national liberation movement, a non-state actor, has been able to be an active 
undeniable partner in world politics. The PLO and similar national liberation 
movements that were able to impose themselves on international agendas as 
principal active actors put the realist paradigm under critique especially the crucial 
notion on which it is built; i.e. nation states are the principal and almost exclusive 
actors in the international system. Nevertheless and even though the organization has 
changed its political program from total liberation to secular democratic state or bi-
national state reaching the implicit acceptance of the two-state solution in 1974, it 
was still caught “between a struggle for a “liberationist strategy” on one hand, and a 
“territorial search for statehood”, on the other. The latter forced the PLO to shift its 
attention from the Diaspora to the occupied territories” (Mohammad, 1997, p.3). 
While the implicit acceptance of the two-state solution in the 12
th
 meeting of 
the PNC in 1974 meant implicitly the establishment of a national authority on a part 
of liberated Palestine (“creation of an independent and fighting national authority on 
every part of Palestinian land to be liberated”), the PLO after 1977 became even 
more territorially-oriented. Actually, the 13
th
 PNC meeting called for the 
establishment of a “national state” rather than “national authority” on any part of 
Palestine which meant the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, events moved 
quickly after the 1977 mainly the winning of Menachem Begin and the Likud 
coalition in Israeli elections in 1977 and their policies of repression and colonization 
in addition to a deliberate policy of ignoring and opposing the PLO, the 1975 
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Lebanese Civil War, the 1978 Camp David Accords between the Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat and Israel, and expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982 after a 
bloody Israeli invasion to destroy Arafat and PLO‟s military infrastructure in 
Lebanon affected PLO‟s strategy and future vision of Palestine and realizing 
Palestinian national aspirations. In fact, these incidents played an important role in 
“depriving the PLO of its military option in dealing with Israel, shifted interest to 
diplomacy, and refocused its attention on the occupied territories (after 1967 Six-
Day War)” (Mohammad, 1997, p.5). In addition to these important regional events, 
the PLO designed its policies especially after its expulsion from Beirut in 1982 in a 
defensive way in order to preserve and maintain its position as well as political status 
as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the body that acts 
and negotiates on their behalf. This incident that is PLO‟s expulsion from Beirut, in 
addition to Israeli Likud‟s government refusal to deal with the PLO put the PLO in a 
desperate political situation.  
The outbreak of the First Palestinian Uprising or “Intifada” in the wake of 
1988 strengthened again PLO‟s position politically and made it the “uncontested 
representative of the Palestinian people” (Mohammad, 1997, p. 4). Moreover, this 
Intifada opened a leeway to Islamist fundamentalists and militias in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, a fact that was in favor of the PLO and allowed it to appear as a 
possible moderate and negotiable partner especially in Israeli and Western eyes. In 
response to such major events, PLO‟s Chairman Arafat presented a peace strategy 
and declared therefore the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in 
Algiers on the 15
th
 of November 1988 (an independent state in West Bank and Gaza 
Strip or the lands that were occupied by Israel after 1967 War). Subsequently, “on 
December 13, 1988 Arafat renounced terrorism (strategy of armed struggle) and 
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accepted the right of Israel to exist alongside Palestine. In doing so, the PLO totally 
renounced its previous goals and strategies and was therefore considered a candidate 
in peace negotiations” (Mohammad, 1997, p.5).  “Other changes on the international 
and regional scenes helped accelerate the process of peace in the region. Most 
important was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War which 
forced many in the Arab World to conclude that they no longer had a patron to 
support their opposition to Israel. Concomitantly, US influence in the region was 
enhanced, as it felt comfortable pressing for peace in the Middle East, especially 
following the Gulf War against Iraq” (Mohammad, 1997, p. 5). 
In 1991, the Palestinians and the Israelis were invited to a conference in 
Madrid Spain in 1991 in order to discuss the core issues between the conflicting 
parties. After two years, the Palestinians and the Israelis signed the “Declaration of 
Principles” known as the Oslo Peace Accords that stated the creation of an 
independent viable Palestinian State after five years. What favored such an 
agreement is the victory of the Labor Party in 1992 Israeli elections led by 
assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. However, in 1996 right-wing Likud 
government rose to power again headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, this fact made the 
possibility of lasting durable peace more elusive. From that time and onward, PLO‟s 
strategy or political program was totally committed to peace process and 
negotiations with Israel that will ultimately lead to coexistence of both peoples and 
the establishment of two states living side by side peacefully in order to put an end to 
a conflict that has been a complicated dilemma to the whole international community 
since sixty five years. 
As the peace process has reached a stalemate and no viable, independent 
Palestinian state has been established as well as the failure of both parties to find out 
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a settlement to the core issues of dispute between them which are mainly borders, 
status of Jerusalem city, refugees and right of return, settlement and settlers, security, 
national resources, and compensation, the current Palestinian President Mahmud 
Abbas took a unilateral step in addressing the United Nations. The first application 
was submitted to the Security Council in September 2011, the second one was 
submitted to the General Assembly in November 2012. The statehood bid at the 
General Assembly was successful because Palestine‟s status was upgraded to a non-
member “Observer State”. The applications were submitted on legal bases which are 
mainly: 
- The Palestinian people's natural, legal, and historic rights based on UNGA 
Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 
- Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine of 15 November 1988 
- -The acknowledgement of this Declaration by the General Assembly in its 
Resolution 177 issued on 15 December 1988 
In addition, this application seeks to affirm Palestine's commitment to 
achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive solution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict based on the vision of two states living side by side in security and peace as 
endorsed by the UNGA, UNSC, and the whole international community. In other 
words, there is no contradiction between the statehood bid and the Palestinian 
Authority‟s commitment to resume negotiations with the Israelis but on the basis of a 
clear and agreed upon frame of reference especially commitment to the 1967 borders 
and a halt of settlement activities in the West Bank. Moreover, the step of addressing 
the United Nations does not seek to isolate or delegitimize Israel; it only seeks to 
delegitimize illegal settlements and Israeli expansionist policy at the expense of a 
viable independent Palestinian state. Finally, the international recognition of the 
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State of Palestine and its admission as a non-member observer state to UNGA 
contribute to reinforcing peace and stability in the region; 132 countries said “YES” 
to Palestine which means that there is an international consent and support to this 
legitimate endeavor. The State of Palestine will now be able to discuss the core 
issues with the State of Israel not as an organization or some political entity but 
rather from a position of one United Nations state whose territory is militarily 
occupied by another state. Therefore, the State of Palestine did not abandon the 
peace plan based on the two-state solution which means that this solution is the basis 
of PLO‟s political program currently though stipulated by a clear terms of reference 
in order to reach a settlement so that negotiations will eventually lead to a concrete 
result that would fully realize Palestinian legitimate aims and national aspirations; 
these aspirations are not legitimate in Palestinian eyes only but in the eyes of the 
entire international community even the United States. 
 
3.4- Conclusion 
In her article “The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Non-State Actors and the 
Public Diplomacy Concept”, Teresa La Porte makes it clear that efficacy and 
professionalism grant non-state actors legitimacy, and these are the factors that give 
them their uniqueness. Therefore, the issue of non-state actors should be addressed 
more seriously in the study of international relations. PLO since its creation has 
succeeded in attaining local and international legitimacy, and it has succeeded in 
internationalizing the conflict with Israel. It is a good example on non-state actors 
not only because it has been so long the sole, legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, has emerged as an important political bloc in the Middle East, 
has adopted changing strategies and a flexible pragmatic political program, has 
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acquired international legitimacy through its different stages of its struggle with 
Israel, and has been a peace partner, but also it satisfies the theoretical conditions of 
active non-state actors as set by theorists who tackled this issue in their studies of 
international relations. 
 The next chapter elaborates on the liberal approach to world politics 
particularly regarding the way it defines non-state actors and how it describes their 
qualities and role. In the first section of the chapter, the general characteristics of the 
liberal theory will be outlined in an attempt to locate non-state actors. The chosen 
case study will be an example of non-state actors in two periods of its history, 
“armed struggle” and diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PLO, A Non-State Actor 
 
4.1- Introduction 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the major characteristics or the 
fundamental underpinnings on which the liberal school of thought was built in 
addition to the position of non-state actors. Here, the chosen case study will serve to 
play as an example on illustrating the effective and undeniable role of such actors. 
Since the case study is discussed in two drastic phases of its history which are armed 
struggle and diplomacy, I find it relevant to shed light on the debate of the use of 
arms by the PLO and whether this employment served or undermined PLO‟s cause 
on the international stage.  Complementary to this debate, the use of arms will be 
assessed in the light of the liberal paradigm and whether it is permitted in a world 
vision that is primarily based on cooperation and peace. The last section will be 
devoted to discuss the PLO in the diplomatic phase as well as a general conclusion 
that prepares for the final chapter of the thesis.  
 
4.2- Fundamental Underpinnings of Liberalism 
Andrew Moravcsik‟s article “Liberalism and International Relations Theory” 
(1992) will be of great help of in this chapter. Moravcsik, a professor of political 
sciences and director of the European Union Program at Princeton University says in 
the abstract of this article that he seeks to present a “framework for non-utopian 
liberal theory of international relations. The central insight shared by all liberals is 
that states are embedded in domestic and international civil society, which decisively 
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constrains their actions. This insight is reformulated as three core assumptions, 
which provide coherent micro-foundational assumptions about key actors, their 
motivations, and the constraints they face. A wide range of hypotheses can be 
derived from this model, including propositions about the effects of democracy, 
nationalism, social inequality, commerce, and international institutions on world 
politics” (Moravcsik, 1992, preface).  This means that the author wants to review the 
liberal approach itself in an attempt to make it more coherent and inclusive of other 
aspects or key actors, a fact which contributes to this study indeed. Moreover, 
Andrew Moravcsik believes that liberalism has advantages over realism because it is 
able to “predict progressive historical change and the substantive content of policy” 
(Moravcsik, 1992, preface). Taking the robust proliferation of different kinds of non-
state actors especially in post World War Two era, this means that liberalism is a 
widely inclusive theory. The author adds that “a liberal paradigm permits more 
rigorous empirical testing of liberal and realist hypotheses against one another, but 
also points toward a productive synthesis between two approaches” (Moravcsik, 
1992, preface). At the beginning of the article, the author stresses that realism has 
long dominated Western thought especially its notions of state power and 
sovereignty, national interests, and unitary decision-making; however this paradigm 
has been put under criticism by many academics that came up with a new paradigm 
known as liberalism (Moravcsik, 1992). According to the author, there are strands of 
classical liberal thought such as “republican liberalism that stresses the fact that 
“liberal democracies tend to be more pacific than other forms of government; 
pluralist liberalism which argues that “the maldistribution of social power or the 
existence of social cleavages creates incentives for international conflict; commercial 
liberalism asserts that “economic interdependence “creates incentives for peace and 
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cooperation; and regulatory liberalism “contends that international law and 
institutions promote international accommodation” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 1).  
However, the author believes that these have a common origin although they 
have been treated as separate hypotheses rather than strands or variants of a single 
coherent theory of international relations (Moravcsik, 1992). In his article, the author 
wants to “propose a framework for liberal theory of international relations that is 
both non-utopian and non-normative” (Moravcsik, 1992). He seeks to go beyond 
utopianism and move towards a positive liberal theory. In other words, Moravcsik 
wants to abandon the early liberal notions based on the metaphysical qualities of 
human nature and focus on the elements in liberal theory which assume rational 
behavior by self-interested individuals (Moravcsik, 1992). However, he adds that 
early political philosophers have sought to “ground liberal political philosophy more 
firmly in a theoretical understanding of individual interests and the social contexts of 
politics” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 5). This means that the author wishes to ground the 
liberal school of thought as a paradigm of social science theory and not a political 
philosophy theory linked to the metaphysics and theology. Early political thinkers 
such as Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Benjamin Constant rejected 
the utopian or metaphysical notions often ascribed to them by realists, Moravcsik 
says. The author adds that these thinkers‟ prescriptions were “grounded in social 
theories predicting variation in interstate conflict and cooperation depending on the 
social conditions” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 6). This historical briefing on the origin of 
the liberal theory is important before dwelling into the core assumptions as it helps to 
give a general background on the liberal theory as well as the efforts undertaken by 
academics and political scientists to make a notable transition that seeks to clarify 
the real notions of liberalism away from utopia and the metaphysics.  
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Moravcsik discusses the basic assumptions of liberalism and puts them into 
three basic notions: the first is “the essential social actors and their motivations, the 
second is the relationship between state and civil society, and the third is the 
circumstances under which states develop strategies and make choices in the 
international system” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 6). For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
not of major concern to discuss the liberal theory thoroughly and its very specific 
details; rather to study non-states actors in the light of this theory and whether they 
have a place or not. Nevertheless, discussing the core assumptions theoretically will 
help me locate the place of these non-state actors and if they have any role. In my 
thesis, the first assumption of liberal theory is very important because it discusses the 
fundamental actors in world politics, and according to the author these are “members 
of domestic society, as individuals and privately-constituted groups seeking to 
promote their independent interests” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 6). He adds that the 
crucial aspect of the liberal theory is that “politics is embedded in a social context, 
which decisively constrains the purposes and the possibilities of government” 
(Moravcsik, 1992, p. 7). Therefore, society is very important in this theory because 
individuals seek to form syndicates, organizations, institutions, and arrangements 
that help to promote their social and political aims (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 7). The 
author puts the idea in simple terms by saying that “liberal theory is 
methodologically individualist, its view of society pluralist” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 7). 
Therefore, pluralism is a defining aspect of a liberal society. The second core 
assumption of the liberal theory is the state-society relations. Moravcsik states at the 
beginning that “governments represent some segment of domestic society, whose 
interests are reflected in state policy” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 9). This means that 
society which is supposedly made up of autonomous individuals and groups takes 
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precedence over states themselves; moreover liberal thinkers tend to create a linkage 
between state and society through domestic institutions. Taking that not all 
governments represent the entire community, the state is only a representative of a 
particular set of social groups. The author adds that such a link between the state and 
the society is done directly through elections or indirectly through social reactions to 
the policies of governments (Moravcsik, 1992). Moravcsik elaborates the last 
assumption which is the nature of the international system which means “the 
behavior of states, and hence levels of international conflict and cooperation; reflect 
the nature and configuration of state preferences” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 10). He adds 
that “for liberals, state purpose, not state power, is the most essential element of 
world politics. In other words, what states do is determined by what they can get” 
(Moravcsik, 1992, p. 11). Moravcsik defends the liberal theory and views it as a 
systemic theory, “one in which foreign policy results from the convergence and 
divergence of state preferences or purposes, not relative capabilities” (Moravcsik, 
1992, p. 12). By saying this, he likes to contradict Stephen Walt who views the 
liberal theory as a “reductionist theory” that neglects the international context of 
state behavior.  
Thomas Gangale argues in his article “Thoughts on Realism, Liberalism, and 
Progressivism (2002) that unlike realism, liberalism views both state and non-state 
actors as equally important. The author likes to use the terms liberalism and 
pluralism synonymously and says that pluralistic states may unite against a clear 
external threat and may disaggregate into components and act transnationally 
(Gangale, 2002). “Foreign policymaking and transnational processes involve 
conflict, bargaining, coalition, and compromise, not necessarily resulting in optimal 
outcomes. There are multiple agendas, with socioeconomic welfare issues as, or 
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more, important than security and national security questions.” (Gangale, 2002). The 
author summarizes his views on liberalism and realism in an interesting way to 
illustrate their differences. He says that “realism is like Newtonian physics in that it 
treats states as unitary billiard balls, and as such, it describes a specific set of 
interactions. On the other hand, liberalism, considering both its economic and 
political branches, is akin to quantum mechanics and relativity, describing 
interactions between more classes of actors at many levels, as well as describing 
different behavior of states under circumstances not considered in realism” (Gangale, 
2002, p. 5). 
Greg Reeson argues in “Differing Viewpoints: Realism, Liberalism and the 
Phenomenon of Terrorism” (2006) that liberals emphasize cooperation among states 
in order to promote interdependence and when discussing states national interests, 
they focus on environmental, societal and technological matters in addition to 
military might (Reeson, 2006). Contrary to the realist approach, non-state actors such 
as multinational corporations, terrorist and guerilla groups, non-governmental 
organizations, as well as transnational actors are considered to be important players 
on the international stage along with states. The author adds that “liberalism stresses 
that many factors are at work in international relations and that the many interactions 
among states and non-state actors can be managed only by an international 
institution where members agree on accepted norms and rules for international 
relations” (Reeson, 2006, p. 4). As Stephen Walt says, “… international 
institutions… could help overcome selfish state behavior, mainly by encouraging 
states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring cooperation” 
(Walt, 1998). Reeson says that liberalism stresses the importance of cooperation 
among states which entails economic interdependence resulting in limited prospects 
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for conflicts. The author goes back Stephen Walt who puts this idea in clear terms 
when says that “economic interdependence would discourage states from using force 
against each other because warfare would threaten each side‟s prosperity” (Walt, 
1998). He goes on to say that, “as societies around the globe become enmeshed in a 
web of economic and social connections, the costs of disrupting these ties will 
effectively preclude unilateral state actions, especially the use of force” (Walt, 1998). 
Therefore, liberalism‟s major strength is that it stresses the prospects of peace and 
cooperation among states. Such cooperation would promote common interests and 
decrease the possibility of resorting to war as a means for achieving international 
goals. 
The above brief introduction serves to give a general understanding of the 
fundamental underpinnings of the liberal theory. However, the major concern of this 
thesis is examining the place of non-state actors and their role in the light of the 
liberal paradigm. As set clear now, non-state actors possess a place in the liberal 
theory and as argued by early liberals such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. In 
“Transnational Relations and World Politics” (1977), the authors elaborate 
extensively the increasing significance of non-governmental actors in international 
interactions. They illustrate their point by furnishing their study with examples such 
as multinational corporations, revolutionary movements, labor unions, and scientific 
networks. Moreover, in their book Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye 
launch a severe attack on classical realism, and their famous notion of “complex 
interdependence” defies the notions on which classical realism is built mainly the 
concepts of sovereignty, statehood, and control of territory and population. They 
clearly establish non-state actors as direct participants in world politics. Therefore, 
their place and role in all fields can no more be denied. They are actually enjoying 
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growing involvement in international relations as many studies suggest. Some of 
these studies also emphasize the urgent need to include such actors in a grand school 
of thought and working on increasing their legitimacy through accommodating them 
in the United Nations. Therefore, the chosen case study will help in shedding light on 
two ideas; the first is challenging the concept of the state-centric taking that the PLO 
has been an active non-state actor on the international stage where as the second is 
working on enhancing their legal status. 
Now, the question to be asked: How does the example of the PLO serve to 
demonstrate the above mentioned two points in the light of the liberal theory? 
Since the year 1964 the PLO has been acting on behalf of the Palestinian 
people in order to achieve political aspirations. It resorted to different means in order 
to address the international community and to let this community pay attention to the 
grievances of the Palestinians. From 1964 till 1968, the organization adopted the all-
or-nothing position to resolve the conflict with the Israelis by resorting to arms. The 
PLO employed military clashes, bombings, plane hijackings, and taking hostages to 
realize its political aims. Sometimes, it went further in its operations, which were 
considered “terrorist” by many even by some figures of the PLO itself, such as the 
Munich Operation of 1972 that led to the killing of 11 Israeli athletes. Despite the 
organization‟s use of arms, PLO‟s late chairman was invited to deliver a speech at 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1974; in the same year the organization was 
granted an “observer status”. As mentioned previously, the organization abandoned 
the maximalist approach or the all-or-nothing position to seek other solutions to the 
conflict. It adopted the bi-national state though not abandoning violence altogether at 
that time. The organization continued to change its political program according to 
the changing political variables regionally and internationally, and this demonstrates 
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again the role of such non-state actors and that not only states are the principal 
players. For instance in 1988 Arafat announced the Algeria announcement where he 
declared the independent state of Palestine, an implicit endorsement of what later 
became known as the two-state solution. Accordingly, the United Nations General 
Assembly issued a resolution in 1988 number 43/177 that confirms significant points 
mainly an “acknowledgement of the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the 
Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988, affirms the need to enable the 
Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 
1967, decides that, effective as of 15 December 1988, the designation “Palestine” 
should be used in place of designation “Palestine Liberation Organization” in the 
United Nations system, without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system, in conformity 
with relevant United Nations resolutions and practice, and finally requests the 
Secretary-General to take the necessary action to implement the present resolution” 
(United Nations Charter). Therefore, the PLO example demonstrates that non-state 
actors may be recognized as international legal entities in addition to having 
influential role in international relations and world politics. The PLO sets almost an 
exceptional example because it has gained what other insurgent and separatist 
movements did not gain. “The Kurds, Croats, Kashmir, the Sikhs, to name just few 
examples of separatist movements which have been active in the recent decades, 
have not gained nearly as much as international legitimacy and support although 
their grievances are at least as convincing as those of the Palestinians” (Merari, 
2003, p. 4). 
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4.3- Debate on the PLO’s Employment of Arms 
Before turning to discuss the diplomatic phase in the history of the 
organization that has started basically after 1991 Madrid Conference (peace process 
stages) and the very recent Palestine UNGA non-member observer state, it is deemed 
significant to study the notion of employment of arms by the organization. This is 
related to the second argument in the thesis which is the need to enhance the legal 
status of non-state actors. The employment of arms as the basic principle in the 
organization‟s political program is very much controversial. While the Palestinians, 
Arabs, and many intellectuals like to call it “armed struggle”, others wish to term it 
something else like “revolutionary violence” or “insurgent terrorism” or “terrorist 
attacks”, and definitely every party has its own justifications and standards. In other 
words, what some blocs or intellectuals consider as “national liberation movements” 
are “terrorist organizations” to other states, political blocs, or international 
institutions. Since according to the UN Charter the right to self-defense is only 
applicable to states, the Palestinian and mainly Arab academics and politicians 
justify that this could be extended to a people that is not yet a state when they have 
been the victim of an armed attack. Their verification to the resort of arms is taken 
by analogy. As known, the entire international community even the US 
administration have welcomed the endorsement of the two –state solution; however, 
the prolonged occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, building of the apartheid 
wall, continuous settlement activities on the land occupied after 1967, the land that is 
supposed to be the Palestinian independent state, and the acquisition of land by force 
would justify the Palestinian right to self-defense according to them. 
Yet, under International Law, the right of national liberation movements to 
resort to force in their struggle for self-determination is hotly debated. While no right 
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to armed struggle to achieve legitimate political aims exists, neither is there an 
explicit prohibition which makes it illegal. Actually, armed struggle for national 
liberation can never include deliberate or indiscriminate attacks on civilians because 
they are clearly and strictly forbidden under customary international humanitarian 
law. For this reason, there is an urgent need to accommodate non-state actors in the 
United Nations Charter including national liberation movements where by their use 
of arms should be strictly regulated by International Law as already discussed in 
chapter one. The above pushes me to shed light on the literature that discussed 
national liberation movements and consequently the employment of “force” or 
“violence”. It is crucial to discuss this aspect at this stage not only because it relates 
to the second argument of the thesis but also it helps to try to set standards and 
criteria to differentiate between the notions of “terrorism” and “insurgency”. Setting 
clear standards will be helpful because the United Nations will then be able to 
accommodate national liberation movements in future amendments in its charter and 
put their use of arms under strict obligations in the light of International 
Humanitarian Law. Nevertheless, a quick assessment, as the discussion below will 
show, that there is a blurred image between “terrorism” and “insurgency” to the 
extent that they are used synonymously sometimes. This is rendered to the fact that 
violence or the employment of arms is a common aspect.  
Aaron M. Young of Norwich University and David H. Gray of Campbell 
University undertook a recent discussion of insurgency, guerilla warfare, and 
terrorism published in 2011. In this study, the two authors believe that violence has 
been used as a tool of political discourse so that the rebels increase the ceiling of 
their political demands, a fact that is clearly applicable to the actions of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization during the “armed struggle” period (Young & Gray, 2011). 
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According to them, the key statement is the following, “the base for insurgency is 
increased power or representation from the masses, utilizing violence as a tool for 
either regime defeat or capitulation of a wide range and scope of demands” (Young 
& Gray, 2011, p. 4). For the authors, an important motivation for insurgency has 
been colonialism which has set the onset of nationalism or nationalistic aspirations of 
the occupied indigenous peoples against the colonizers; this point has been an issue 
for many academics who studied it under the notion of “revolutionary terrorism”. 
The reason why rebels or insurgents resort to violence is tackled by Young and Gray 
is put in Hoffman‟s terms, “the use of violence is not only to draw attention to, or 
generate publicity for a cause, but also to inform, educate, and ultimately rally the 
masses behind revolution” (Hoffman, 2006). 
In another article entitled “Explaining Revolutionary Terrorism” (2006), Jeff 
Goodwin says that grievances push revolutionaries to adopt violence. Goodwin 
elaborates the term “revolutionary terrorism” and defines it as “the strategic use of 
violence and threats of violence by a revolutionary movement against civilians or 
non-combatants, and is usually intended to influence several audiences” (Goodwin, 
2006, p.201). This definition has the virtue of pointing out that violence has been 
employed as a political strategy by revolutionary groups in an attempt to oust or 
terminate a state‟s power within a definite territory. In his essay, he proceeds to talk 
about “categorical terrorism”, which targets civilians by virtue of belonging to a 
specific class, ethnicity, nationality or some other collectivity (Goodwin, 2006). This 
elaboration could be applied on the Munich operation that was conducted in 1972 by 
“Black September”, one of the PLO factions at that time. This Palestinian group 
attacked Israeli athletes because they belong to a specific ethnicity. Another example 
on categorical terrorism is the operation conducted by members of the Popular Front 
68 
 
for the Liberation of Palestine in 2001 whereby the Israeli Minister of tourism, 
Rahba‟am Zaefi, was assassinated. He also discusses the already existing theories on 
terrorism to expose their flaws and shortcomings; in other terms he wants to show 
why revolutionaries, like the case study here at a certain stage, would resort to 
“violence” or “terrorism” as Goodwin and others may call, to achieve their aims. For 
the author, employing such a method gives revolutionaries the pretence to construct 
their social enemies and set them as targets of violence to reach their goals. Ariel 
Merari too brought this aspect under discussion in his article “Terrorism as a 
Strategy of Insurgency” (1993). He examines the characteristics of terrorism being 
one of the various strategies employed by insurgents in order to achieve their 
political aims. In this article, the author considers “terrorism as a mode of struggle 
rather than a social or political aberration” (Merari, 1993, p. 2). Merari approaches 
the phenomenon of terrorism technically rather than moralistically. He intends to 
study it in the context of being a form of political violence, examines its features, 
and discusses it as a strategy. In the final section of his paper, the author considers 
the extent to which terrorism has been successful as a mode of insurgent struggle. 
One of the basic elements that he lays is that terrorism, as a strategy chosen by 
insurgents, is the result of specific circumstances and not an individual choice. 
Again, this principal is crucial because it relates to the PLO during a particular stage. 
As a matter of fact, violence has been entrenched at the heart of the conflict between 
the Palestinians and the Jews over 64 years. Logically, violence between both parts 
stems from nationalistic aspirations, ambitions, and grievances, and it is well-known 
that the conflict is of a territorial nature.  
Tomis Kapitan in a study entitled “Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict” 
(2004) separates between “who initiated terrorist violence” and who exercised 
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“retaliation”. In other words, he separates between “strategic terrorism when 
violence is a coercive threat that is part of a plan to achieve a political goal, but 
reactive if it derives from an emotional response to political induced grievances” 
(Kapitan, 2004). Many academics share Kapitan‟s views such Ilan Pappe and stress 
that the new comers or Zionists were the first to initiate acts of hostility and 
aggression (forcible transfer, massacres, ethnic cleansing, demolishing of villages) to 
realize their political aspiration which is the establishment of the State of Israel. 
Menachem Begin, founder of Likud Party and the sixth Prime Minister of Israel 
wrote that “of the about 800,000 Arabs who lived on the present territory of the State 
of Israel, only some 165,000 are still there” (Begin, 1951). Chaim Weizmann, 
Zionist leader and President of the Zionist Organization, considered the exodus of 
the Arabs a miraculous clearing of land; the miraculous simplification of Israel‟s task 
(Chaim Weizmann). According to the author, strategic terrorism that was employed 
by Israel especially at the beginning of the conflict has allowed it to achieve political 
ends and achieve victory on the social and political levels. According to Kapitan, the 
Zionists‟ actions provoked the indigenous Palestinians to resort to acts of retaliation; 
he mentions the early revolutionary ideologies that existed in Palestine before the 
initiation of the PLO such as that of “Sheikh Izzeddin al- Qassam who was the first 
to call for an Islamic resistance to Zionism (Kapitan, 2004). Thefore, Kapitan 
justifies the Palestinian resort to violence as the result of the grievances that faced 
the Palestinians. This reiterates the grievance-based theories, one of the fundamental 
theories given by scholars to explain terrorism.  
For instance, the plane hijacking operations conducted by one revolutionary 
of the PLO in 1969 and the Munich Operation conducted by Black September in 
1972 are considered as acts of insurgency in order to promote a political aim and not 
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acts of terrorism as the US and other powers categorize. Nevertheless, Ariel Merari 
does not deny the fact that some networks and organizations with national liberation 
aspirations resort to terrorism in order to achieve their political ends or to gain 
international legitimacy. To summarize this idea, the author says, “Some insurgent 
groups are both terrorist and freedom fighters, some are either and some are neither” 
(Merari, 1993, p. 5). This could be applicable to Fatah‟s initial strategies. Khalid al 
Hassan, one of prominent Fatah‟s figures, said once, “The armed struggle technique 
was ostensibly simple. We called this and tactic actions and reactions, because we 
intended to carry out actions, the Israelis would react and the Arab States, according 
to our plan, would support us and wage war on Israel. If the Arab governments 
would not go to war, the Arab peoples would support us and would force the Arab 
governments to support us. We wanted to create a climate of fighting spirit in the 
nation, so that they will rise and fight.” This quotation is taken from Guy Bechor‟s 
“Lexicon of the PLO”, Tel Aviv, Ministry of Defense Publishing House in 1991. 
Therefore, it is obvious that more studies need to be conducted in order to identify 
the critical thin line that differentiates between “terrorism” or “terrorist acts” and 
“acts of insurgency” or “revolutionary insurgency” that aim at achieving rightful 
aspirations. Taking that both have strategic political objectives and employ arms, 
setting standards and criteria will be a difficult and thorny task; at the same time it 
will be important because it will help to enhance the legal status of national 
liberation movements in the context of International Humanitarian Law. 
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4.4- Did the Employment of Arms Serve or Undermine PLO’s 
Cause? 
The argument which is important to pose here is whether “insurgent 
violence” or “terrorist actions” have served or undermined PLO‟s cause. Such an 
argument is important because in both cases it demonstrates the role of the 
organization as a non-state actor. To answer this, it can be noticed that many 
observers believe that the Palestinians cannot realize their own dreams of self-
determination and aspirations because there will be a superior Israeli military 
oppressing them. They consider that violence is the only solution to attract 
international attention. For Tomis Kapitan, PLO‟s political program that was based 
initially on “armed struggle” would benefit the organization in many ways. First, the 
Palestinian militants‟ abilities to strike their enemy would consolidate the sense of 
unity and solidarity among the Palestinians themselves. Second, employing violence 
against Israel would allow the latter to consider the high prices of continuing its 
occupation to Palestinian land. Third, through violence the Palestinians will succeed 
to draw regional and international attention to their cause (Kapitan, 2004). Also PLO 
gained an observer status at the UNGA in 1974 in addition to another UNGA 
resolution (3236) which clearly asserts the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people. Therefore and though the organization‟s operations of 
armed struggle, hijacking, suicide bombings, assassinations, and taking hostages 
generated Western condemnations, these actions opened the way for the PLO to 
express the grievances of the Palestinian people on international forums. 
Other scholars discuss with scrutiny whether “violence” has really served 
PLO‟ cause. In his article “Can Terror Work? The Case of the Palestine Liberation 
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Organization” (2011), Jack Greig says that international terrorism has brought PLO 
international recognition; nevertheless the campaign of terror failed to support the 
political aims and aspirations of the organization (Greig, 2011). For him, what he 
calls “terrorist activities” mainly between 1968 and 1973 though supported by many 
global camps failed to win the sympathy from all political blocs especially the US 
and British government which continued to give Israel the pretext to pursue its own 
notions of self-defense (Greig, 2011). Greig however does not acknowledge the fact 
that the State of Israel was established on an Arab land, neglects Israeli methods of 
“ethnic cleansing” when they first arrived to Palestine in 1948, and turns a blind eye 
to the memoires of almost all Zionist leaders who preached forced transfers and 
massacres to realize the aim of Greater Israel.  
On the other side, Kapitan in his article elaborates that “the terrorist label 
automatically places actions and agents outside the norms of acceptable behavior, 
and consequently erases any incentive an audience might have to question the nature 
of their grievances and the possible legitimacy of their demands” (Kapitan, 2004, p. 
9). He tries to apply this definition on PLO‟s political program during the “armed 
struggle” period. The author adds that the Israelis actually employed the “rhetoric of 
terror to deflect attention away from their own controversial policies in the occupied 
territories and towards the more spectacular reactions by the Palestinians. They 
realized that it would be to their advantage to portray Arab terrorists as the enemies 
not only of Israel but of the entire Western world” (Kapitan, 2004, p. 9). In one word 
Kapitan says that “the rhetoric of terror is itself a mechanism of state-terrorism, 
enabling Israel to consolidate its hold on the territories by emphasizing the need for 
Israel‟s security in the face of Arab terrorism, while submerging any consideration of 
the Palestinians‟ own security concerns” (Kapitan, 2004, p. 9). Kapitan in his article 
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insists that there has been mutual violence even after the signing of the Oslo Peace 
Agreement. He mentions the incident of the Israeli settler who killed Palestinian 
worshippers in Hebron in order to express his fury against the peace process; 
Palestinian revolutionary militants in turn retaliated by random suicide bombings 
against Israeli casualties (Kapitan, 2004). From his own view point, mutual violence 
will only serve to undermine comprehensive peace between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis.  
Nevertheless, the PLO underwent a shift in its political program and 
techniques very early. It sought other solutions to the Palestine-Israel conflict such as 
the secular, democratic state for both people mainly after the 1967 defeat in addition 
to the 1988 Palestinian Declaration which included the acceptance of what later 
became known as the two-state solution. Therefore, the PLO gradually adopted a 
more moderate view in approaching the conflict. For instance during the seventies, 
the organization found it very important to react to Henry Kissinger‟s diplomatic 
initiatives as well as Geneva Convention of 1973. The regional and international 
transformations pushed the PLO to call for a revision of its policies that alternated 
between maintaining its commitment to “armed struggle” or working with the Arabs 
and the entire international community to find out a satisfactory settlement that 
would not ignore Palestinian claims. 
 
4.5- Assessment of “Armed Struggle” in the Light of the Liberal 
Paradigm 
How can the “armed struggle” period of the PLO be assessed in the light of 
the liberal paradigm taking that the PLO is a non-state actor and after discussing its 
early stage (use of arms). First, it is important to set clear that the strategy of the 
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employment of arms, sometimes referred to as “terrorism”, by individuals, networks, 
organizations, and groups will continue to be present because there are many reasons 
that constitute pretexts for the use of arms such as national aspiration and self-
determination, social, economic, and political grievances, poverty, inequality, racial 
and ethnic discrimination, separatist aspirations, radical ideologies and many others. 
Under such intricate circumstances, many groups and movements may employ a 
strategy of violence in order to realize their objectives whatever they may be. 
Moreover, this will continue to create disparity among scholars and intellectuals. 
Some will consider this strategy just; others will not support it. What is definite is 
that scholars, individuals, even states will judge from a particular stance or position 
in the international structure. On the other hand, technological advancement and 
media play an important role in this respect too. As a matter of fact, prominent media 
channels and news agencies such as Reuters, al Jazeera, and al Arabiya affect and 
shape the public opinion‟s notions and concepts of what terrorism or violence means. 
While Western media perceived PLO‟s actions as terrorism at a particular time of 
PLO‟ history, many media networks and observers considered these same actions as 
rightful acts of insurgency to achieve self-determination and independence. Now, if 
PLO‟s acts are seen as terrorist activities, then it is deemed important to discuss the 
relation between the liberal theory and terrorism. Since liberalism embraces 
international peace and cooperation as well as global justice, it is obvious that 
terrorism has no place in the overall liberal approach to the world. 
In his article “Differing Viewpoints: Realism, Liberalism, and the 
Phenomenon of Terrorism”, Greg Reeson argues that “terrorists do not want to foster 
economic and security cooperation and do not wish to create a world of economic 
interdependence” (Reeson, 2006, p. 4). Therefore, liberals believe that those who 
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commit acts of terrorism are criminals and should be dealt with in a judicial manner 
by some international institution (Reeson, 2006). This makes the liberal school of 
thought lacking because it fails to address the reason behind such actions such as the 
case under consideration (political or nationalistic); therefore, it turns a blind eye to 
the grievances of some peoples. Moreover, “by holding on to liberal values, the 
liberal approach to international relations treats terrorists as criminals and disregards 
the fact that some states support and sponsor terrorist activity for the purpose of 
achieving political objectives. This fact severely “limits liberalism‟s ability to 
explain the phenomenon of terrorism and to offer substantial methods for dealing 
with those who practice violence against civilians for political purposes” (Reeson, 
2006, p. 5). To summarize this idea, it is clear that the liberal approach is insufficient 
to explain terrorism and the reasons (especially nationalistic grievances) why some 
groups may resort to terrorist activities. liberalism, which triumphs international 
cooperation and the interaction between state and non-state actors to promote 
interdependence and reduce conflict, fails to provide a coherent frame that includes 
and explains terrorist activity or the resort to arms by some groups or organizations 
(Reeson, 2006). This is the reason why there is an urgent need to accommodate non-
state actors in the United Nations Charter, enhance their legal status in general and 
the status and national liberation movements in particular as well as regulating the 
use of arms by these movements under International Humanitarian Law. 
 
4.6- PLO and Diplomacy 
This section of this chapter is devoted to discuss the role of the PLO during 
the diplomatic phase that eventually led to upgrading Palestine‟s status to a non-
member observer state at the UNGA. In fact, it is important to shed light on this 
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phase in the current history of the organization because it helps in challenging the 
state-centric approach that gives primacy to states exclusively on the international 
stage. The official diplomatic phase between the Palestinians and the Israelis has 
started after Madrid Conference that was convened in 1991. Then American 
Secretary of State James Baker invited Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians 
to send delegations to meet in Madrid, Spain in order to discuss peace plans between 
Israel and the neighboring countries. One of the basic issues on the conference‟s 
agenda at that time was a plan for a Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as well as discussing the fate of the Palestinian refugees. The significant 
outcome of the conference was bringing Israeli and Palestinian negotiators together; 
this led Israel and the PLO to open secret independent negotiations the following 
year that resulted with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, which in turn 
allowed Jordan to conclude a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.  
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that the Oslo Accords have old roots that 
could be traced back to the aftermath of 1973 October War. This detail is important 
to mention in order to show how the organization flexibly reacted with the changing 
dynamics of the region to realize its political aspirations. In a relatively new article, 
Osamah Khalil argues in “Oslo‟s Roots: Kissinger, the PLO, and the Peace Process” 
(2013) that the PLO was ready to open channels with the Americans and the Israelis 
before the beginning of the official negotiations. The author says that the PLO was 
open to such an option at a time when it achieved a notable diplomatic recognition 
by the United Nations and the Arab League as the “sole, legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people”. During Nixon‟s office, the Secretary of State and National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger worked on organizing a multi-lateral conference 
in Geneva, however the looming question at that time was whether the PLO would 
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be invited to participate in the conference. PLO‟s chairman Arafat was forced to 
react to regional and international circumstances mainly October War 1973, six-
month oil embargo by Arab countries of the OPEC, concern over the possibility of 
annexing the West Bank to Jordan, and finally the fear of leaving the PLO on the 
sidelines of any comprehensive agreement (Khalil, 2013). “Like Sadat, Arafat 
believed that the U.S held the key to Israeli concessions and an eventual settlement.  
Arafat began to pursue relations with Washington publically and privately” 
(Khalil, 2013, p. 2). Moreover, William Buffum U.S ambassador to Lebanon, at that 
time continuously reported to Washington signs that Fatah‟s leadership is seeking 
possibilities of direct contact with American officials; yet the organization had to 
allay fears among its supporters and the fedayeen that it did not abandon its long-
term goals. The author gives an example of an event held at the Beirut Arab 
University on November 27, 1973 whereby Salah Khalaf “Abu Iyad”, Arafat‟s 
deputy, combined in his speech revolutionary jargon with notable elements of 
pragmatism. The American ambassador Buffum concluded that the basic and most 
influential faction of the PLO, i.e Fatah, in addition to other factions such as the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were ready to participate in 
peace talks (Khalil, 2013). Speaking in front of public, the General Secretary of the 
DFLP Nayef Hawatmeh called for the establishment of an independent national 
entity on any land liberated from Israel. Therefore, “Buffum informed Kissinger that 
Hawatmeh‟s speech represented the clearest public indication to date that the bulk of 
the fedayeen leadership is moving more and more out of its protective shell in 
preparation for the peace conference” (Khalil, 2013, p. 2).  
The Geneva Conference was held on December 21
st
, 1973 without Syrian 
participation and the PLO‟s; however PLO‟s leadership mainly Yasser Arafat and 
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Salah Khalaf continued to hint on the evolving position of the organization and the 
willingness to attend future sessions (Khalil, 2013). Despite the fact that the PLO 
was trying to open up channels with the American officials and project a moderate 
image of itself, the PLO continued to launch attacks and operations against Israeli 
targets which often undermined the efforts it was exerting in its evolving stance 
toward pragmatism. Emphasizing this new stance, Robert Houghton, charge 
d‟affaires at U.S Embassy to Lebanon reported to Henry Kissinger that Yasser 
Arafat and Salah Khalaf are considered “moderates because their views on an 
eventual settlement with Israel were relatively more realistic and positive than those 
held by their die-hard associates and many of their followers” (Khalil, 2013, p. 3).  
PLO‟s chairman Arafat continued in this new direction, and the Palestine 
National Council met on June 1
st, 1974. Osamah Khalil says that “Fatah and the 
DFLP wanted to accommodate Moscow and Cairo with a more pragmatic approach, 
while demonstrating to Washington that it was a potential partner for peace talks. 
However, they faced resistance from the PFLP and its allies” (Khalil, 2013, p. 3). 
Despite the rejectionists‟ stance, Arafat signed a communiqué with Egypt and Syria 
which signaled the organization‟s willingness to engage in negotiations with Israel. 
As a result, American officials continued to report to Henry Kissinger this dramatic 
change in the PLO‟s political stance and urged him to open communication channels 
with the organization, but Kissinger and Israel refused to respond. William Quandt, 
National Security Council staffer, stated that “Arafat clearly wishes to work toward a 
political settlement and recognize Israel‟s right to exist” (Khalil, 2013, p. 4). “In 
early January 1975, Ambassador G. McMurtrie asserted that “however inconvenient 
its existence or repugnant in its behavior, the PLO has become a reality and has the 
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sympathy and support of at least a broad spectrum of Palestinian and Arab popular 
opinion across the region” (Khalil, 2013, p. 4).  
Arafat continued to send out signals to Washington that show his readiness to 
compromise and engage in peace talks to reach a political settlement. In 1975 and 
1976, Arafat had talks with American senators, and he made two proposals that 
convinced those officials of the organization‟s pragmatism. Though the political 
program of the organization during this period focused on the principal of a secular 
democratic state for two peoples, Arafat made two proposals that focused on 
establishing two states living side by side as settlement to the ongoing conflict 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Nevertheless, the escalation of the fighting 
in Lebanon during the Civil War and PLO‟s participation in the fight alongside the 
National Front provided the organization with an opportunity to prove to 
Washington its value. “Although Kissinger was bound by a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Israel, as he explained to President Ford there was no 
commitment to Israel not to talk to the PLO about the situation in Lebanon” (Khalil, 
2013, p. 7).  
Though Kissinger had shown a slight change in his stance toward the PLO, 
he placed further negotiations on hold. In a meeting with U.S ambassadors from 
different Arab states, Kissinger was still firm that any meeting or talk with the PLO 
would get the U.S administration into trouble with the Jews though a lot of the 
ambassadors urged him to involve the PLO in negotiations (Khalil, 2013). Though 
Kissinger fully realized that eventually Washington had to deal with the 
organization, but as he says in his memoires, he had “to keep them behind the Arab 
governments. Recognition – of the PLO – will come at the very end after the Arab 
governments have been satisfied. In short, Kissinger wanted to impose an agreement 
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on the PLO” (Khalil, 2013, p. 8). Arafat continued to pursue his attempts to open 
channels with the U.S administration, “and C.I.A Director and future President of 
George H. W. Bush informed Kissinger that Arafat wanted a totally secret pre-
dialogue channel with the United States” (Khalil, 2013, p. 8). He reported that the 
organization was “far more ready to compromise than it was in the past. The PLO 
had grown wary of the different Arab countries who were attempting to use it for 
their own ends or to serve as insincere intermediaries with Washington” (Khalil, 
2013, p. 8). According to the author, Bush advised that PLO‟s chairman has in his 
mind political negotiation with Washington (Khalil, 2013).  
It was only when President Jimmy Carter assumed office in 1976 that the 
American administration sought to engage with the PLO. In fact, Carter wanted to 
work out a comprehensive solution in the region; however his efforts faced a 
domestic backlash in addition to the winning of the right-winged Likud Party in 
1977 Israeli elections. Therefore, the domestic element along with Israeli elections 
forced the American President to pursue a less ambitious objective (Khalil, 2013). 
Carter‟s hopes that the 1978 Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel will be a 
stepping stone toward concluding future agreements were turned down. “The  
conservative resurgence in American politics that unseated Carter in 1980 led to a 
resumption of Kissinger‟s approach of ignoring, undermining, or attempting to 
destroy the PLO” (Khalil, 2013, p. 8). Arafat and other PLO officials continued their 
attempts to convince Washington that they are ready to compromise and present 
concessions before sitting on the negotiation table. Khalil notes that “the major 
difference between the Oslo and Kissinger eras was that American and Israeli 
governments were finally willing to accept those concessions and negotiate with an 
eager and desperate PLO” (Khalil, 2013, p. 9). Khalil‟s arguments were also 
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mentioned in Afif Safieh‟s book The Peace Process, From Breakthrough to 
Breakdown. Safieh, who served as a Palestinian General Delegate in London, 
Washington, and Moscow from 1990 to 2008, says that, “It was from October War 
in 1973 and onwards that Palestinian peace diplomacy started manifesting itself with 
increasing clarity” (Safieh, 2010, p. 54). He adds that, “One has to read Kissinger‟s 
memoires to learn that the PLO, since November 1973, was desirous of joining the 
peace process and the Geneva Conference. Kissinger says that he authorized a high 
level meeting in Morocco in December 1973 between General Vernon Walters and a 
Palestinian delegation that included Khaled al Hassan and the late Majed Abu 
Sharara. Kissinger recalls that he let the discussions drag on until the Geneva 
Conference was over, thus neutralizing the mainstream PLO from actively opposing 
his peace process” (Safieh, 2010, p. 37). Khalil‟s and Safieh‟s arguments shed light 
on the PLO‟s dynamic role on the regional and international levels to achieve its 
political aspirations; the organization‟s political program was not monolithic or a 
mere revolutionary jargon but rather reacted to different circumstances.  
In his book The Peace Process, From Breakthrough to Breakdown, Safieh 
mentions as well that, “All Middle East specialists and observers have underlined the 
realistic approach of the PLO” (Safieh, 2010, p. 20). The realistic approach of the 
PLO marks the transition from the early maximalist approach or the concept of total 
liberation to endorsing the one-state solution or the bi-national state and finally the 
two-state solution. On this Safieh comments by saying that, “The two-state solution 
was not always the PLO program for an acceptable peace. Up to 1974, a democratic 
state, bi-cultural, multi-confessional and multi-ethnic, was the official policy. 
Unfortunately, this project was rejected and misunderstood. That program, which is 
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the bi-national state, failed to materialize in the realm of the possible, but it was 
undeniably not incorrect on the level of principles” (Safieh, 2010, p.36).  
Therefore, the role of the PLO, as an active non-state actor can never be 
ignored. Safieh puts this idea in simple terms by saying that, “Before seeking 
international recognition, the PLO had already obtained internal legitimacy. It 
unified the political expression of a geographically / demographically dispersed 
people and began channeling their struggles towards the common goal: the right of 
return and independent statehood. In other words and very early, the PLO presented 
the international community with many signals that show its readiness for 
accommodation and flexibility. Through its willingness to embrace the attempts to 
reach comprehensive peace in the region during the seventies, at a time when there 
were armed clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians, “the PLO hoped to 
abandon the dialogue by arms and resort to the arms of dialogue” (Safieh, 2010, p. 
37). Afif Safieh recapitulates in chapter five in the same book the overtures and 
policies pursued by the PLO to reach a comprehensive settlement to the Palestine 
question. In addition to Arafat‟s attempts during the seventies, the author recounts 
some attempts that were made during the eighties and after the PLO was expelled 
from Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli invasion. The author says that, “In April 1984, 
Arafat in an interview to the Nouvel Observateur declared that the PLO was in favor 
of mutual recognition between Israel and the “State of Palestine”. I suppose that the 
choice of this magazine was deliberate. It is mainly a French-Jewish Leftist weekly. 
It was expected that this statement would not go unnoticed in Israel and would 
become part of the political debate. And yet dovish politicians must have considered 
that it would be electorally unrewarding to respond favorably to such an overture” 
(Safieh, 2010, p. 57). Moreover, the author stresses that during 1984 and 1985 the 
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PLO emphasized its willingness and readiness to accept United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 242 if Washington accepts the principle of the right of 
Palestinian self-determination (Safieh, 2010). 
The date of 9 December 1987 is considered to be a turning point in the 
history of the region; it is the date of the outbreak of the First Palestinian Uprising or 
Intifada. Safieh says that, “For the first time in Western public opinion, the 
perception of the Palestinians in this bipolar Israeli-Palestinian relationship started to 
be that of an oppressed and persecuted people who had an interest in the 
achievement of peace. Western public opinion began to see us as the victimized 
party in this bipolar relationship” (Safieh, 2010, p. 154). The author gives three 
reasons that pushed the American administration to bring the Palestinians and the 
Israelis to the negotiation table. The first one is the Gulf War. Safieh elaborates this 
by stating that the United States wanted to discipline a misbehaving regional actor, 
i.e. Iraq; therefore, the American administration was forced to react to the unfinished 
business of Israel-Palestine. The second factor is the end of the Cold War. As a 
matter of fact, the Israelis benefited a lot from the bipolar rivalry between the United 
States and the USSR and succeeded in convincing the American officials that it can 
play an important role in containing Soviet expansionism. As a result, the Israelis 
received unconditional and unlimited support from the United States (Safieh, 2010). 
The author adds that, “Now that the United States is no longer obsessed with the 
containment of Soviet expansionism, we should put on the agenda the containment 
of Israeli expansionism” (Safieh, 2010, p. 157). The third factor as Safieh wishes to 
explain it is the following; “It is Israeli expansionism that today is emerging as a 
nuisance to American global and regional interests” (Safieh, 2010, p. 158). After the 
Palestinian Uprising, the PLO went to Madrid at the invitation of James Baker, U.S 
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Secretary of State. Safieh says that the PLO was “in favor of a peaceful resolution in 
the Middle East conflict, yet we thought and dreamed of an international conference 
sponsored by the United Nations, with the presence of five permanent members of 
the Security Council to implement and not to interpret the UN resolutions” (Safieh, 
2010, p.159). After Madrid Conference, the Palestinian and the Israeli negotiators 
continued their meetings and were hosted by Norway. As a result, 1993 Oslo Peace 
Accords (Declaration of Principles or DoP) were signed by the conflicting parties. 
Under DoP, Israel was to relinquish authority over the West Bank and Gaza Strip to 
a newly created Palestinian National Authority headed by Arafat. However, Israel 
retained ultimate power and continued to confiscate land, build settlements and roads 
which split the Palestinian villages and cities. Moreover, the Declaration of 
Principles (DoP) left many issues unresolved including the status of Jerusalem, 
security arrangements, and finally the borders between Israel and a Palestinian state.  
Subsequent agreements followed in 1994 (Cairo Agreement), 1995 (Oslo 
Two), 1998 (Wye River Memorandum), and 1999 (Wye River 2) and again failed to 
address the fundamental weakness of the Oslo Accords. The Camp David 2000 
Summit is a turning point in the history of negotiations between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis. Ehud Barak, the Israeli Prime Minister then, offered the Palestinians 
95% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, 
and 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank‟s Jewish settlers) 
be ceded to Israel. Despite all this, Israel would still control bypass roads and put 
checkpoints; moreover and according to Palestinian sources the free travel of the 
Palestinians would be impeded.  
Arafat refused this offer, and again no tenable solution was crafted which 
could satisfy both the Israeli and the Palestinian demands. Then, Taba Summit was 
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convened in 2001, and the Israeli negotiation team presented a new map. Taba 
Summit was considered positively by the Palestinians, and they viewed it as a basis 
for further negotiation. However, Ehud Barak did not conduct further negotiation at 
that time; the talks ended without an agreement and the subsequent months 
witnessed the election of the right-wing Likud Party candidate Ariel Sharon. The 
efforts to implement peace continued, and for this aim Beirut Summit took place in 
March 2002. The summit gave rise to the “Arab Initiative for Peace” and it called for 
a comprehensive peace treaty in the region based on the internationally recognized 
formulation of “land for peace”, a return to June 4, 1967 borders, borders in 
exchange for normal relations with Israel and finally a collective peace agreement.  
Sharon welcomed the initiative; however, he claimed that peace is only 
possible when the Palestinian Authority puts an end to terror (in reference to 
Netanya suicide attack perpetrated on an evening previous to the Beirut Summit). 
Nevertheless, Israel was unable to handle or cope with a full withdrawal to 1967 
borders and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. Another proposition to 
put an end to the conflict was advocated by the quartet of the US, EU, UN, and 
Russia whereby they outlined the principles of a “Road Map for peace” which 
includes an independent Palestinian state. The Road Map was released in April 2003 
after the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the first-ever appointed 
prime minister because both the American and the Israeli administrations refused to 
work with Arafat. According to the Road Map for peace the Palestinian Authority 
must take serious actions to prevent individuals and groups from conducting violent 
attacks on Israel and rebuild the Palestinian Authority security apparatus. On the 
other side, Israel was asked to dismantle settlements established after March 2001, 
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freeze settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after 
September 28, 2000, and ease restriction on the passage of persons and goods. 
Under this plan, neither party has fulfilled its obligations. What has been 
achieved is that Israel dismantled settlements only those constructed post March 
2001 in the West Bank and has actually expanded others; Israel also evacuated the 
whole Gaza Strip in August 2005 and dismantled all its settlements there. However, 
Israel military continued to redeploy and patrol into Palestinian controlled areas in 
what it describes as actions to combat terrorism. Furthermore, the Palestinians did 
not make much progress in stopping the attacks against the Israelis. At the end of 
November 2007, President George H.W Bush called for an international conference 
of representatives from nations that support the establishment of two states, 
renouncing violence, recognizing Israel‟s right to exist, and urging the disputing 
parties to stick to the agreements they concluded before. However and even though 
Annapolis‟ aim was to persuade both sides to agree negotiate final status issues, the 
conference occurred in a highly politicized context with sharp divisions in the 
Palestinian and Israeli camps. This fact made it very hard to reach an agreement. The 
conference had many important political signals; it showed that the Arabs look for a 
strategic alliance with the United States against increasing Iranian hegemony in the 
Middle East as well as a support for Mahmoud Abbas over Hamas. Despite all this, 
the recommendations at Annapolis failed and they were not implemented as it failed 
to address Hamas and include Syria, absence of unified Palestinian political 
platform, and most importantly the presence of weak Palestinian and Israeli 
leaderships. Since 2007 Annapolis Conference till now, the peace process between 
the Palestinians and the Israelis has reached a stalemate despite all the efforts to 
revive it. Commenting on the peace process, Safieh says in his book that, “When 
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Labor was still in power in Israel, I often repeated that it seemed to me in this peace 
process, we, the Palestinians, were interested in peace but that the Israeli side seemed 
more interested in the process itself. Today, with Netanyahu and the Likud presiding 
over an extreme right-wing coalition, I believe that we have neither peace nor a 
process anymore” (Safieh, 2010, p. 190). The stalemate in the peace process pushed 
the Palestinian Authority to take two unilateral steps to address the United Nations; 
the first was addressing the Security Council and the second was the General 
Assembly. Mahmud Abbas told the New York Times, "Recognition would 
internationalize and change the legal status of the conflict. It would also allow the 
Palestinians to pursue claims against Israel at international bodies, including the 
International Court of Justice." He added that "the Palestinians have been negotiating 
with Israel for 20 years without coming any closer to realizing a state of our own” 
(The New York Times, 2011, p. 1). In September 2012, the PLO was able to 
internationalize the conflict and has finally succeeded in eliciting de jure recognition 
from more than 130 states in the General Assembly. Palestine is now an “observer 
state” and not an “observer entity” at the international forum. With this diplomatic 
success, the State of Palestine will now be able to discuss all the core issues of the 
conflict not as an organization or “observer entity” but rather from a position of one 
United Nations state whose territory is militarily occupied by another state. 
 
4.7- Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the dynamism of the PLO as a non-state 
actor in world politics. The PLO could change its political program and manifests 
flexibility and accommodation relating to the Palestine question. From a maximalist 
approach to coexistence, the PLO succeeded in achieving such a drastic 
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transformation, and it showed that national liberation movements as non-state actors 
cannot be ignored in the international arena. In the last chapter of this thesis, the 
main arguments presented in the previous chapters will be summarized in order to 
show whether they have been efficient in answering the research question. Moreover 
there will be an assessment whether the PLO has been successful or not in promoting 
its cause during the armed struggle period and diplomatic period. The final word will 
be an assessment of the significance of this study and if it does contribute to the 
realm of the topic under examination which is non-state actors.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Recapitulation, Recommendations, and General 
Conclusion 
 
5.1- Introduction 
The concluding chapter of the thesis will be an opportunity to recapitulate the 
ideas set in the previous chapters and see if they serve to answer the research 
question that has been set. In other words, it is an opportunity to see if the chosen 
case study has helped in demonstrating the undeniable role and place of non-state 
actors in world politics. Taking that the chosen non-state actor in this thesis is a 
national liberation movement, I also find it relevant to say a final word on the 
significance of taking armed groups seriously in the sense of finding ways to 
improve their compliance with International Humanitarian Law or accommodating 
them in the United Nations Charter. Actually, the door must be open to address all 
kinds of non-state actors whose fields of work range from humanitarian and 
environmental fields, developing civil society, monitoring human rights violations to 
national liberation movements that do represent some peoples. Such a serious legal 
accommodation of non-state actors will not only help to set definite standards and 
criteria for their work in the public sphere but it will also help in categorizing them 
and discriminating between those acting for the public good or seeking legitimate 
goals of self-determination and the radical ones like al-Qaeda. The final chapter will 
be an opportunity as well to examine how the armed struggle and diplomacy have 
allowed the PLO to operate as a non-state actor seeking statehood.  
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In this chapter, I also pose some questions and answers relevant to the 
summary of the basic ideas of the thesis; the interview was conducted with Mr. 
Bassel Akl who served as the first Palestinian Representative to the United Nations 
Security Council, Director of the Arab League Office in London, first head of PLO 
Political Department, and currently a member of Palestine National Council, and 
Deputy Chief of the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Palestine Studies. 
 
5.2- Recapitulation on the Place and Role of Non-State Actors and 
the Need to Address their Legal Status 
As should now be clear, there is a robust increase in the number of non-state 
actors and their growing involvement is transforming international relations. 
Although some of these non-sovereign entities have been created and controlled by 
states such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), their role and place are 
developing beyond being their mere agents. Even though states are considered to be 
dominant actors in the international system to the extent of being the sole principal 
actors according to the realist paradigm, non-state actors have indeed succeeded in 
developing their status and maintaining a place that cannot be ignored anymore. Bob 
Reinalda traces the history of non-state actors in “Non-State Actors in the 
International System of States” and says that “the phenomenon of non-state actors 
began with the emergence of private societies or organizations with a public purpose 
in the late eighteenth century. Reinalda elaborates that “between the years 1815 and 
1909 thousands of international non-governmental organizations were established 
with numbers rising from 400 in 1920 to 700 in 1939, 1, 470 in 1964 and 7,300 in 
2005 (or even 13,600, if all internationally-active NGOs are taken into account). 
Within states voluntary organizations between the private and public spheres – 
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private in form, public in purpose – are denoted by terms such as pluralism, 
lobbying, keeping political systems open and civil society” (Reinalda, 2011, p. 12). 
The author‟s demonstrations and statistics show how non-state actors are growing in 
terms of numbers, prestige, and wide range of activities. This allows them to use all 
the resources that they have in order to be effective in their respective societies. To 
put it in Reinalda‟s terms, “Non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations 
use their power resources (expertise, closeness to target groups, domestic political 
constituencies, access to the media, finances, and alliance building) when exercising 
influence through access to international institutions, agenda setting, framing, 
coalition building and monitoring implementation” (Reinalda, 2011, p.12). 
Therefore, his argument matches that of Teresa La Porte‟s, already mentioned in 
Chapter One, when she discusses the robust proliferation of non-state actors which 
are active in the public sphere through employing huge available resources and 
finally succeeding in affecting national agendas to the extent of even “radically 
modifying security parameters” which is the case of al-Qaeda (La Porte, 2012).  
Moreover, Richard Higgott emphasizes in “Coming to Terms with 
Globalization: Non-State Actors and Agenda for Justice and Governance in the Next 
Century” (1999), the growing involvement of non-state actors such as NGOs in the 
public sphere. He also talks about the “rise of multilateralism and emerging 
emphasis on civil society” (Higgott, 1999, p. 14). According to him, non-state actors 
are seen as influential and effective actors in a wide range of key policy areas of 
international relations in an era characterized by globalization (Higgott, 1999). The 
author renders the robust proliferation of these non-sovereign entities in a globalized 
interdependent world to many elements such as technological advancement, liberal 
democratic politics, and economic efficiency or development. Challenging the state-
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centric approach, Higgott sees the emergence of “global civil society” in which non-
state-actors operate as traversing the boundaries of the sovereign states, and the 
behavior of such actors is seen to be highly internationalized and politicized and very 
effective. Higgott also reiterates the role of non-state actors in many areas such 
decision-making abilities, environmental concerns, human rights monitoring, 
strengthening children‟s and women‟s rights, securing social justice and watching on 
human rights violations (Higgott, 1999). 
Reinald‟s and Higgott‟s elaborations are considerably new in the study of the 
growing number and involvement of non-state actors, and definitely both have relied 
on the early attempts that realized their role and tried to include them in a grand 
political theory. These early attempts were already discussed in chapter two mainly 
the work of Oran Young who came up with the mixed-actor approach that focuses on 
the interaction between different kinds of actors in the international system 
regardless of any kind of hierarchical relationship. Also James Roseneau tries to 
present an integrated paradigm for the analysis of the international system where 
non-state actors are direct participants in Turbulence in World Politics. In addition to 
these attempts, earlier attempts to discuss the liberal paradigm have laid the solid 
foundations of presenting the complexity of the international system and the 
involvement of non-state actors such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 
“Transnational Relations and World Politics”, a study which is furnished with a big 
number of case studies on non-state actors as well as their book Power and 
Interdependence whereby they came up with the notion of complex interdependence. 
In fact, many scholars and critics believe that Keohane‟s and Nye‟s Power and 
Interdependence is one of the most powerful and influential books which tried to 
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develop a scientific pluralist paradigm to the classical state-centric approach and to 
realize and engulf non-state actors.  
In short, the activity and influence of non-state actors have increased in the 
international system which is characterized by great economic integration and 
revolution in communications and technology; their discourse of action is very wide, 
and it reflects commitment to securing social justice, accountability, spreading 
democracy, protecting the environment, as well as monitoring violations and 
implementation of human rights. Moreover, “they are seen as global actors; they are 
agents or players of big influence. They are clearly capable of setting agendas and 
changing international policy on important issues” (Higgott, 1999, p. 19). Despite 
this significant influence they still need to be more seriously addressed in the sense 
of enhancing their legal status and accommodating them in the United Nations 
Charter. The legal status refers to the rights and obligations or duties of non-state 
actors. According to Higgott, minimal efforts have been exerted to address the 
“rights-duties” balance within the non-state actors‟ family. This can be done through 
the formation codes of conduct to them which institutionalize their role and enhance 
their abilities in policy and law making processes.  
Enhancing the legal status of non-state actors includes as well the importance 
of answering basic questions relating to these actors as Teresa La Porte argues and as 
already discussed. The questions revolve around “justification on whose behalf they 
act, who they represent, and whose interests they defend, and what citizens‟ rights 
have been delegated to them” (La Porte, 2012, p. 5). She argues that efficacy gives 
non-state actors legitimacy because they are able to respond to the various needs of 
the civil societies in which they operate, yet they still need to universalize their 
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values, enhance the credible criteria of their work such as transparency and 
accountability, and perform effectively. 
Higgott addresses different kinds of concerns on the legal status of non-state 
actors. He believes that sometimes they have fallen in the trap of being victims of 
their own success in the sense that states and intergovernmental organization policy-
making elite pay them the respect of treating them seriously (Higgott, 1999). 
Moreover, he believes that many of them do not function in accordance to the basic 
elements of representative democracy. This means that senior officials in such actors 
sometimes advance personal agendas at the expense of the needs and wishes of the 
constituents they ought to represent (Higgott, 1999). Therefore Higgott says that, “If 
non-state actors are to become important and legitimate agents of attempts to secure 
acceptable structures of global governance, then they too will have to accept the need 
for transparent, accountable and participatory systems of management and control, of 
the kind they wish to impose on national agendas.” (Higgott, 1999, p. 19). A final 
word to say, it is a two-way path for non-state actors: advocacy of efficiency and 
transparency in the public sphere which will pave the way for their full legal 
accommodation in the UN Charter.  
Taking that the case study is a national liberation movement and capitalizing 
on the importance of addressing non-state actors and enhancing their legal status, it 
is crucial to shed light on the importance of increasing the compliance of national 
liberation movements to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in order to set fixed 
standards in armed conflicts. While the right to self-defense is exclusive to states 
only according to the United Nations Charter, some academics extend this to a 
people that are not yet a state when they have been the victim of an armed attack. In 
fact, under International Law, the right of national liberation movements to resort to 
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force in their struggle for self-determination is debatable. While no right to armed 
struggle to achieve legitimate political aims exists, neither is there an explicit 
prohibition which makes it illegal. However, armed struggle for national liberation 
can never include deliberate or indiscriminate attacks on civilians because this is 
strictly and clearly prohibited under customary International Humanitarian Law. 
Moreover, the International Humanitarian Law is designed to regulate warfare 
between states, and it paid very minimal attention to the interest of non-state actors.  
Cedric Ryngaert argues in “Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian 
Law” (2001) that “non-state actors that members of an armed group, have 
comparatively few rights under International Humanitarian Law, as is clear from a 
comparison of the limited number of provisions of Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions (i.e., the Convention governing non-international armed 
conflicts, pitting government forces against insurgents)” (Ryngaert, 2001, p. 1). The 
author sees that the imposition of duties on non-state armed groups such as national 
liberation movements is not addressed properly, and he renders this to the fact that 
since states view rebel groups as outlawed groups, they tend to resist granting such 
groups an international legal personality for fear that this might legitimize their 
actions (Ryngaert, 2001). Therefore, without legal personality, it is impossible to 
bound national liberation movements with legal obligations. Therefore, the legal 
status of armed non-state actors like national liberation movements should be 
addressed in order to legitimize their actions and increase their compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law. In return, this allows the international community 
to address the grievances of some people especially those seeking legitimate rights of 
self-determination as the Palestinians. How can this legal status be enhanced? In the 
same article, Ryngaert tries to frame some proposals. They include the following: 
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- “First, armed non-state actors can unilaterally declare their intent to be bound 
by (IHL) or parts of it. Such unilateral actions can create binding obligations 
under (IHL) for the actors from whom they emanate. They can react 
positively with Geneva Call, for instance, which encourages such groups to 
sign up a Deed of Commitment. 
- Second, they can be given the capacity to enter into conventions under 
International Law on the basis of moral aprioris. 
- Some non-state actor involvement in the drafting process is desirable, 
because this would enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the (IHL) and 
encourage non-state actor compliance with it. Therefore, an armed group and 
the very government which it is fighting against will be able and willing to 
draft (IHL) rules in a constructive manner” (Ryngaert, 2001, pp. 5&6).  
  As a result, there should be a mutual effort exerted by the United Nations 
Agencies as well as the armed non-state actors in order to enhance the legal status of 
such groups and increase thereby the credibility and transparency of relevant UN 
agencies. This will also help in setting the standards and criteria to each case 
individually and addressing its cause whether it is legitimate (like rightful self-
determination) or not as well as casting off radical groups that resort to acts of 
terrorism. 
 
5.3- PLO: A Verification of Non-State Actors’ Effectiveness in 
World Politics 
 In the first section of chapter five, the basic notions on non-state actors are 
recapitulated basically their prestigious role and influence in addition to the need to 
enhance their legal status. This section will take into account the chosen case study. 
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Does the example of the PLO reinforce the argument on the place and role of non-
state actors? In order to answer this question, two phases which have marked the 
organization‟s history were tackled particularly in chapters three and four: the 
employment of arms as means to reach political ends as well as diplomacy as means 
too to realize political ends manifested with the need to establishing an independent 
viable Palestinian state.  
As already mentioned, the PLO has changed its strategies over time in order 
to achieve its political ends there by making it a distinct actor in regional politics 
though not a state. In his very influential and important book entitled Armed Struggle 
and the Search for State (1997), Yezid Sayigh says in his preface that “the key to the 
survival of the Palestinian national movement and to the attainment of at least a 
modicum of its objectives was the ability to affect fundamental shifts in goals and 
strategy at critical stages in its evolution. These shifts took place in response to 
external circumstances and challenges, but they also required parallel changes in 
ideology, structure, and internal politics” (Sayigh, 1997, p. viii). This quotation 
shows how the PLO has reacted to the changing regional and international dynamics 
which therefore has set the context and has dictated Palestinian politics. What Yezid 
Sayigh does in his book is offering a “historical reconstruction of the evolution of 
Palestinian political programmes, ideological discourse, and organizational 
structures” (Sayigh, 1997, p. viii). When the Palestinian National Liberation 
Movement (Fatah) was first initiated by a group of students from the Diaspora, the 
ultimate goal was the total liberation of historic Palestine or the Palestine that existed 
in the minds of most of the Palestinians before 1948. As Yezid Sayigh puts it, “The 
ultimate goal was clear: to liberate the whole of Palestine and to destroy of what it 
termed a colonialist, Zionist occupation state and society. The original Jewish 
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community in Palestine, that pre-dated the British mandate, could remain but would 
do so under unequivocally Arab sovereignty” (Sayigh, 1997, p. 88).  To achieve its 
goals, “Fatah insisted on two principles: the absolute independence of Palestinian 
organization and decision-making from Arab governments and the primacy of armed 
struggle as the sole means of liberating Palestine” (Sayigh, 1997, p. 89). Moreover, 
Fatah deemed it very crucial to “establish an autonomous political entity with 
independent organizational structures to ensure national revival” (Sayigh, 1997, p. 
89).  
Therefore at this early stage, the two important notions on which Fatah 
Charter was based are revolution and armed struggle to achieve political objectives, 
mobilize the Palestinian people, and assert the Palestinian identity. An early Fatah 
memorandum stated, “We, the people of Palestine, are in need of a revolutionary 
upheaval in our daily lives after having been afflicted by the Catastrophe of 1948 
with the worst diseases of dependency, division, and defeatism. This upheaval in our 
lives will not occur except through our practice of the armed struggle and our 
assumption of responsibility for it and leadership of it. Khalid al-Hassan, one 
prominent Fatah figure, expressed the same message prosaically, “the Palestinians 
have no citizenship and so they have no history and no rights, duties, or sense of 
belonging. Without exercising those functions they became nothing. Restoring those 
functions requires returning to the homeland, but that in turn requires force” (Sayigh, 
1997, p. 91).  
The above shows the very early Palestinian stance regarding the Palestine-
Israel conflict and the means to solve it particularly during the sixties of the last 
century; a stance or a strategy (or political program) that has changed during the 
seventies, eighties, and nineties. According to Yazid Sayigh, “armed struggle (which 
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characterized the early political program of the PLO) provided the political impulse 
and organizational dynamic in the evolution of Palestinian national identity and in 
the formation of parastatal institutions and bureaucratic elite. It did so by driving 
mass politics and the establishment of a national political field, in the process 
enabling new political class to form, gain recognition and legitimacy, and assert its 
leadership” (Sayigh, 1997, vii).  
Though the PLO‟s “actions of violence” or what has been termed in the thesis 
as armed struggle has generated condemnation that viewed the resort to arms as 
undermining Palestinian aims, Bassel Akl has something to say when commenting 
on a question to assess the use of armed struggle by the PLO and other factions. He 
says,  
“I would like to notify that the acts of violence were sometimes carried out 
by groups which were not under the umbrella of the PLO such as that of Black 
September‟s Munich Operation in 1972 that led to the killing of Israeli athletes. So 
far as the PLO is concerned, its initial political program that was based on armed 
struggle or the all-or-nothing approach to liberate the historic land of Palestine, these 
actions may have brought international attention to the Palestinian cause media wise, 
but on the long run the acts of violence carried out by PLO militants, I believe, have 
done harm more than good because the Israeli propaganda machine has started to 
portray Palestinian struggle as a series of terrorist attacks. In addition to the above, 
the resort to violence was not in the interest of the PLO considering the wide gap in 
the balance of power between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Palestinians acts of 
armed struggle, I believe, have always initiated brutal Israeli retaliation, and 
Palestinian casualties paid a high price for that. Besides, I see, what is the wisdom of 
resorting to acts of violence when the United States is both politically and militarily 
backing Israel? I believe that the adoption of armed struggle in 1964 has become 
obsolete, but at that time the PLO could not have taken off without at least paying 
“lip service” to armed struggle in order to rally Palestinian people around the PLO 
and for international propaganda in drawing the attention of the international 
community to the grievances of the Palestinian people”.  
The PLO continued to shift its strategies and sought other solutions to the 
Palestine-Israel conflict when it proposed the bi-national state early during the 
seventies. The PLO leadership called for a revision of its early position due to 
regional and international circumstances; the proposal called for the creation of a 
non-sectarian secular state in which all Jewish residents who had come to Palestine 
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prior to 1947 would become citizens; however the PLO did not abandon its 
commitment to armed struggle altogether because of many internal reasons. When he 
was asked about his assessment of the bi-national state or the “one-state solution” 
when it was first proposed in late sixties and early seventies, Bassel Akl answered by 
saying,  
“When the one-state solution was first proposed, I see that it might have been 
pre-mature because the PLO had not gone yet through the experience of direct 
negotiations with the Israelis, but by judging today‟s Palestinian traumatic 
experience in negotiating with Israel, one is almost bound to say that the two-state 
solution has unfortunately come to an end. The emphasis on the one-state solution is 
gaining tremendous momentum; however this solution will not help much in 
reaching a settlement of the conflict because it strips Israel of its Zionist character, 
and this would complicate the matter further. Israel though will have to face 
demographic facts in the coming years that the historic land of Palestine is 
overwhelmingly Palestinian (Arab). I believe that the Palestinians have learned the 
lesson of 1948, and they will not leave their country. Therefore, I see that the talk on 
the one-state solution will increase”.   
Sayigh writes that “an entire era ended when Palestine Liberation 
Organization chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
presided over the signing of the Declaration of Principles (D.O.P) or the Oslo 
Accords on 13 September 1993. Their exchange of letters of recognition ended 
decades of mutual denial between the national communities they represented, even if 
the accord did not fundamentally resolve all aspects of the conflict” (Sayigh, 1997, 
vii). This quotation marks the launch of the diplomatic course adopted by the PLO 
and which was preceded by the Madrid Conference of 1991 that brought Arab and 
Israeli delegations together; moreover, the official solution of the conflict after that is 
the two-state solution that was endorsed implicitly by the PLO leadership when it 
first declared the establishment of the independent Palestinian state in Algeria in 
1988. This course in the history of the organization shows how the PLO has kept 
changing its strategies in a changing world and illustrates how a non-state actor has 
been malleable with such changes thereby rendering it active on the international 
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stage. Answering the question on his assessment of PLO‟s diplomatic course, Akl 
says,  
“The PLO has done extremely well since the Madrid Conference in 1991. It 
has gained political grounds internationally. However, what is needed at a very early 
stage from now is the Palestinian Authority forming daring policies that reflect 
initiatives which challenge U.S total surrender to Israeli pressure. By initiatives, I 
mean, that it is a high time now that the Palestinian leadership should start seeking 
recognition from other United Nations affiliated organizations such as the ICC and 
the ICJ to start real and concrete pressure on Israel. In this respect, I would like to 
refer to Senator James William Fulbright who served as the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee who once said that the American policy on the 
Palestine question is an Israeli-dictated policy; it is a hopeless attempt to liberate 
America‟s foreign policy from Israel”.  
Therefore, the PLO has indeed been an effective regional player and non-
state actor because it has been able to accommodate and change its political program 
and strategies over time. Moreover, “a majority of the international community came 
to recognize its status as the representative national organization of the Palestinians; 
it enjoyed full membership in the League of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, 
and other multinational groupings of Third World States, as well as observer status at 
the United Nations” (Sayigh, 1997, p. xi). 
 
5.4- A Final Word 
 The main purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the relevance and role of 
non-state actors in global politics. I tried to tackle how these actors have been dealt 
with in the various schools of thought of international relations in an attempt to 
locate their place. Yet, the examination exposed that they need to be addressed in a 
more serious manner to define them, categorize them, legitimize their role within the 
United Nations Charter through working on enhancing their legal status, and finally 
incorporating them in a grand political theory. Between realism that makes the place 
of non-state actors almost inexistent and their role negligible, hopes were raised with 
other approaches such as neo-realism whose founding father is Kenneth Waltz and 
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his book Theory in International Politics. Nevertheless, Robert Keohane says about 
Waltz‟s theory that he did not try to initiate a new theoretical approach but rather he 
systemized political realism into a rigorous theory or in other words to reestablish 
the basic tenets of the realist paradigm. Hopes were raised again with Oran Young‟s 
mixed-actor approach and James Rosenau‟s contribution in his book Turbulence in 
World Politics. Both authors took into absolute consideration the complexity of the 
international system and the interdependency of international relations as well as 
capitalizing clearly and explicitly on the role of non-state actors as direct participants 
in world politics. Though no coherent integral theory or paradigm that seeks to 
include them was formulated by both, they did contribute a lot in the study of this 
topic. Since, I intended to study an example on non-state actors from a liberal 
pluralist approach, it can be said that liberalism gives equal importance to both states 
and non-state actors. One academic says that the liberal theory resembles quantum 
mechanics and relativity because it allows for more interactions between different 
classes of actors at many levels. Moreover, liberalism has always been associated 
with multilateralism and pluralism, a fact which allows for a wide margin of 
recognition of non-state actors. For instance, Geoffrey Wiseman introduces a new 
concept in book Polylateralism and New Modes of Global Dialogue (2004) whereby 
he elaborates on new relations between states and non-state actors. Richard Higgott 
too focuses on multilateralism in a paper entitled “Coming to Terms with 
Globalization: Non-State Actors and Agenda for Justice and Governance in the Next 
Century” whereby he focuses on the continuous emphasis on civil society as well as 
the robust emergence of non-state actors in key policy concerns due to economic 
interdependence, liberal democratic politics, and technological advancement. 
Though there is an urgent need to tackle these non-sovereign entities more 
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extensively and enhancing their legal status in a way that matches and covers their 
increasing prestigious role, non-state actors have been indeed active in setting 
agendas, affecting governmental agendas to the extent of pressing for real changes, 
monitoring different kinds of violations especially in terms of human rights, 
watching on the implementation of various processes, collaborating in decision-
making and policy making, drafting rules and shaping them especially in the field of 
non-governmental organizations, creating security parameters due to the existence of 
terrorist non-state actors and finally acting on achieving political objectives such as 
self-determination through representing some peoples as it is the study case in this 
thesis. 
On the PLO and the Palestine – Israel conflict, much work has been done to 
the extent that the entire aspects of this conflict have been covered. Answering a 
question on the aspects that have not been covered relating to the case study, Akl 
answers by saying, 
“I believe that every aspect concerning the PLO has been tackled extensively 
to the extent that there is so much literature that can be barely covered in its entirety. 
The United Nations has shown great interest and concern for territories which are 
still under occupation and particularly it has shown great attention regarding the 
Palestine Question. I believe that the PLO has received much sympathetic support 
from the United Nations over the years especially from the United Nations General 
Assembly and its resolutions. Nevertheless, I see that such resolutions are considered 
to be mere recommendations because they have not been implemented. Had UNGA 
resolutions been implemented, the Palestine-Israel conflict would have been settled 
years ago. Palestinians do not ask for more than the implementation of all United 
Nations relevant resolutions”.  
Therefore, the PLO has been an active regional player in the sense of reacting 
to the dynamics of the changing politics regionally and internationally, and this has 
been now set very clear since the beginning of the thesis. The PLO has adopted 
armed struggle at early stages to draw international attention to the grievances of the 
people it represents as well as the cause it is struggling for. Moreover, it has shown 
flexibility to diplomatic initiatives during the seventies through the proposal of the 
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bi-national state solution then consenting to go for direct negotiations with Israel 
through all the stages of the peace process. Moreover, it took a unilateral step in 
November 2012 and succeeded in upgrading Palestine‟s status to a non-member 
observer state.  
Regarding the limitations of the diplomatic course of the PLO and what is 
needed to revive Palestinian ambitions to achieve self-determination, Akl says,  
“There is no end to the ambitions of a people who do have a vision, and the 
Palestinians have the vision and the capability. I see that there is no end to 
diplomatic maneuvering in various means mainly at this stage addressing certain 
United Nations affiliated agencies through capitalizing on the legal status of 
Palestine Liberation Organization as a non-member observer state. I believe, and this 
is my personal and subjective point of view, that the Palestinians need as well a 
Palestinian peaceful widespread uprising against Israeli occupation. In fact and after 
years of involvement in decision-making, I see that the chances for the United States 
to exert any real pressure on Israel are non-existent unfortunately. As a matter of 
fact, the Israelis are in the position of exerting pressure on the U.S and not vice 
versa.” 
Moreover, the PLO, in both armed struggle and diplomatic course, has 
succeeded in asserting itself as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people despite the recent political strife between the Fatah and Hamas leadership. On 
this political strife between both factions, Akl says,  
“At the beginning, it is an imperative to underline the fact that the Palestine 
question is an Arab cause and not a mere Palestinian cause. When the PLO sought 
recognition as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 
during the Rabat Arab Summit, it was because the PLO wanted to assume its 
responsibility and leadership of the cause. I see that there is no reason for the PLO to 
relinquish the responsibility character of the Palestinians despite the sad and 
unpardonable cessation of the West Bank from Gaza Strip. Besides, I see that the 
PLO is the moderate political bloc that is willing to work with the international 
community to achieve a just settlement for the conflict”. 
Finally, the PLO in its quest to achieve legitimate political aspirations 
through the adoption of different political programs or strategies and in its success to 
assert itself as a representative of a community, it demonstrates an example on an 
active non-state actor whose political performance has been constantly changing 
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dictated by the regional and global circumstances. Akl comments on these changing 
strategies by saying,  
“The changes in PLO‟s strategies have been bound to become a reality 
because the Palestinians do not live alone in the world; they are part and parcel of a 
dynamic world which keeps changing. In all fairness, I am inclined to say that the 
PLO has moved over years from a “world of illusions”, when it adopted armed 
struggle to solve the conflict, to a world of “real politick, when it has resorted to 
diplomacy to reach a just settlement”. 
A final word that could be said at the end of this thesis is that despite the fact 
that I have chosen this case study to reinforce the place and role of non-state actors; 
ironically this same example can be used to consolidate in a way the realist paradigm 
or the state-centric approach. In fact, the PLO‟s armed and diplomatic struggle have 
been channeled to becoming a full-fledged independent sovereign state. This point is 
also reinforced in Yezid Sayigh‟s book when he says that, “The Palestinians have 
engaged almost continuously since 1948 in a historical process of state-building, 
with the PLO gradually emerging after 1964 as the non-territorial equivalent of a 
state. National liberation has been the goal of many movements in the colonial and 
post-colonial eras of the twentieth century, but the Palestinian case shows that the 
state-building dynamic does not come into operation only after independence. 
Rather, the search for state shapes the articulation of goals, formulation of strategies, 
choice of organizational structures, and conduct of internal politics through much of 
the preceding struggle” (Sayigh, 1997, p. viii) 
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Appendix: List of Interviews 
 
1. Critical discussion with Professor Walid Khalidi on October 20, 2013; 
Khalidi is an Oxford educated Palestinian, general co-founder of the Institute 
for Palestine Studies and research fellow at the Harvard Center for 
International Affairs.  
2. Critical commentary (especially relating to the PLO sections) from Doctor 
Mohammad Shtayyeh on April 20, 2013; Shtayyeh is a member of the 
Palestinian delegation during the Washington Talks, the talks on the interim 
agreements, and all final status negotiations including the talks initiated by 
the Quartet; he participated in the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee to coordinate 
donor support for Palestine and is the head of the delegation for multilateral 
talks with the Regional Economic Development Working Group concerned 
with problem-solving regional trade, finance and infrastructure issues; acts as 
a senior advisor to President Mahmoud Abbas on negotiations with Israel. 
3. Interview with Bassel Akl conducted on November 21st, 2013; Akl is the first 
Palestinian Representative to the United Nations Security Council, Director 
of the Arab League Office in London, first head of PLO Political 
Department, and currently a member of Palestine National Council, and 
Deputy Chief of the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Palestine Studies.  
